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Abstract
The 2009 Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring indicated that Head Start grantee non-compliance
findings have increased since 2008, implying that grantee non-compliance is an issue for the Head Start
field. The poor performance of grantees during Federal Monitoring Reviews demonstrates the critical
need to investigate turnaround practices of Head Start directors who have successfully improved their
low-performing programs to high-performing in compliance with the Head Start Performance Standards
(HSPS) and successfully achieved a Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. The investigation of
Head Start turnaround practices is not reflected in the current literature. However, business and K-12
settings have contributed to scholarly literature regarding organizational turnaround. The purpose of this
study is to examine the dynamics of the turnaround process in Head Start programs as described by
directors of underperforming programs that experienced turnaround and the leadership behaviors
implemented to facilitate performance improvements. The study employed a qualitative cross-case
analysis, guided by Kotter’s (1996) Eight-Stage Change Model as the conceptual framework to investigate
Head Start turnaround practices. The qualitative methodology enabled the researcher to analyze the
relationship between the strategies the leaders engaged in and the changes within their programs. The
findings revealed four themes as described by the Head Start turnaround directors: a) Organizational
Noncompliance, (b) Managing Self, (c) Managing Others and (d) Systems Turnaround. Additionally, the
findings unveil the introduction of the Four- v Stage Turnaround Model. Moreover, the researcher
proposed six recommendations, three recommendations for the Office of Head Start (OHS) and three
recommendations for Head Start directors. The Head Start field will benefit from informed research in an
effort to build a capacity for successful turnaround strategies. This effort will minimize the potential of
performance issues plaguing Head Start programs threatening the continuity of quality of educational
services for children.
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Abstract
The 2009 Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring indicated that Head Start
grantee non-compliance findings have increased since 2008, implying that grantee noncompliance is an issue for the Head Start field. The poor performance of grantees during
Federal Monitoring Reviews demonstrates the critical need to investigate turnaround
practices of Head Start directors who have successfully improved their low-performing
programs to high-performing in compliance with the Head Start Performance Standards
(HSPS) and successfully achieved a Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. The
investigation of Head Start turnaround practices is not reflected in the current literature.
However, business and K-12 settings have contributed to scholarly literature regarding
organizational turnaround. The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of the
turnaround process in Head Start programs as described by directors of underperforming
programs that experienced turnaround and the leadership behaviors implemented to
facilitate performance improvements.
The study employed a qualitative cross-case analysis, guided by Kotter’s (1996)
Eight-Stage Change Model as the conceptual framework to investigate Head Start
turnaround practices. The qualitative methodology enabled the researcher to analyze the
relationship between the strategies the leaders engaged in and the changes within their
programs. The findings revealed four themes as described by the Head Start turnaround
directors: a) Organizational Noncompliance, (b) Managing Self, (c) Managing Others and
(d) Systems Turnaround. Additionally, the findings unveil the introduction of the Fourv

Stage Turnaround Model. Moreover, the researcher proposed six recommendations, three
recommendations for the Office of Head Start (OHS) and three recommendations for
Head Start directors. The Head Start field will benefit from informed research in an effort
to build a capacity for successful turnaround strategies. This effort will minimize the
potential of performance issues plaguing Head Start programs threatening the continuity
of quality of educational services for children.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 promised a “war on poverty” by
introducing community programs to advance the poor. The Head Start project was born
out of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). President Lyndon B. Johnson
envisioned a social competence program to provide low-income children educational and
supportive services to help them overcome the challenges of poverty. Head Start
promised to provide high-quality preschool programming to prepare children for school.
Today more than 25 million children and their families have benefited from the
comprehensive services of Head Start (Zigler & Styfco, 2010).
Head Start is a federal program administered through the Office of Head Start
(OHS), a division within the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS)
Administration for Children and Families (ACF). OHS provides competitive Head Start
grants to over 1,600 grantees across the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.
Grantees include nonprofits, for-profits, community action agencies, tribal nation
programs, and agencies serving migrant and seasonal workers (Zigler & Styfco, 2010).
Grantees are awarded five-year renewable grants to provide comprehensive services to
disadvantaged children and their families. Additionally, grantees will designate other
local nonprofits or public agencies part of its duty for operating the Head Start program,
these agencies are referred to as delegates. Grantees and its delegates are awarded funds
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to actualize Head Start’s mission to provide children with high-quality education, health,
nutrition, physical, and disability services.
Children served by Head Start are between the ages of three and four years old.
Early Head Start programs serve children from six weeks to 36 months. Head Start and
Early Head Start services are free to families who qualify. Family income must be at or
below the Federal Poverty line. Parents are viewed as partners in their child’s education
and are decision-makers in the management systems of the programs. Additionally, Head
Start provides supports to the parents of the children served by helping them meet their
goals towards economic self-sufficiency (http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov).
Performance standards. The OHS provides oversight of its grantees to ensure
that the programs follow the Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS). In 1975, ten
years after the inception of Head Start, ACF developed a set of performance standards
that were issued in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Register,
1975). Head Start programs are mandated to adhere to the HSPS standards to maintain
their Head Start funding.
In 1995, ACF designed Early Head Start (EHS) under the auspice of Head Start in
response to the need to support pregnant women, infants and toddlers. Subsequently, the
Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS) were updated to include provisions for EHS.
In 1996, Federal Monitoring began as a process to ensure programs were operating in
compliance with HSPS.
In 2007, under the Bush administration, congress reauthorized the Head Act with
a renewed focus. The Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act, better known as
the Head Start Act of 2007 was developed to strengthen the quality of the program.
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Moreover, operating under a new guiding framework, the act encompasses state early
learning standards, increased stringency in teaching qualifications, enhancement to the
HSPS, a system of designation and renewal for grantees, and greater program monitoring
(http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov, 2013).
Additional reform enacted in the 2007 Head Start Act includes a mandate that
low-performing grantees must compete to renew its grant. “Recompetition,” a concept
developed under new regulations set by President Barack Obama mandating that any
grantee which fails to provide high-quality services set by new federal quality regulations
must compete for its grant against other potential community providers. In the past, Head
Start grantees would automatically continue its funding despite its failure to comply with
Head Start Performance Standards. Under recompetition guidelines the low-performing
grantee may also reapply for the grant. This system of designation renewal system also
distinguishes grantees delivering high-quality Head Start services. Moreover, offering
continued grants to high quality Head Start programs for a period of five years
noncompetitively.
Recompetition. In 2011, OHS announced that 132 of the 1,654 Head Start
grantees will need to compete for its federal grant due to its failure to meet the mandated
HSPS. In 2012, 122 grantees were announced, as a second round of grantees, mandated
to recompete for continued funding. Under the rules of recompetition, 25% of Head Start
grantees will be evaluated annually for compliance with the HSPS. Programs that fail to
meet set standards will need to vie for grant funds against other community providers.
The goal of recompetition is to raise the quality of services and defund low-performing
grantees. Until now, a process of competition has never been part of the refunding of
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programs. In some instances, grantees have been the long standing sole grantee of the
Head Start Grant (Headstartredesignation.com).
Monitoring reviews. The Office of Head Start (OHS) conducts triennial reviews
to ensure that Head Start programs are complying with the HSPS. OHS conducts the
reviews to ensure that Head Start programs do not have “systemic or substantial material
failures” (Head Start Act, 2007). All Head Start programs are required to receive a
Federal Monitoring Review at least once every three years. Annually, OHS conducts four
types of Federal Monitoring Reviews: (a) First Year, (b) Triennial, (c) Other, and (d)
Follow-up (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). First Year reviews are
conducted on grantees within their first year of operation, Triennial reviews are
conducted every three years, Other reviews are usually desk reviews typically initiated
due to grantee performance concerns when grantees are found deficient and
noncompliant, and a Follow-up review is conducted when grantees fail to meet the
mandated standards (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009).
During the Federal Monitoring Review, the program is evaluated on its ability to
provide evidence of meeting the HSPS. Federal reviewers act as fact finders who detect
matters of program performance. During Federal Monitoring Review, grantee compliance
outcomes are determined by the Federal Review Team. At the completion of the on-site
review, grantees will achieve one of three determinations: (a) compliant, (b)
noncompliant, and (c) deficient. A grantee with no findings identified during the review
will be determined as compliant. A grantee with one or more areas of non-compliance
and no deficiencies is determined as noncompliant. Furthermore, grantees with one or
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more deficiencies are deemed deficient (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring,
2008).
Deficiencies are more serious than non-compliances. Head Start defines
deficiency as a performance failure in one of the following eight areas: (a) a threat to the
health, safety, or civil rights of children; (b) denying parents their rights to exercise their
full roles and responsibilities related to the operation of the program; (c) failing to
comply with the program standards; (d) misuse of funds; (e) loss of legal status, childcare
license, debarment from receiving federal grants or contracts; (f) failure to meet or
correct any agency requirement; (g) failure of the governing body to exercise its legal and
fiscal responsibilities; and (h) failure to resolve an area of non-compliance (Head Start
Act, 2007).
Grantees are expected to correct non-compliances and deficiencies. Prior to
recompetition, when a deficiency was identified, the federal reviewer would conduct a
Follow-up review within six months to ensure the deficiency is corrected. Today, the
stakes are higher and a deficiency finding will almost guarantee a grantee an immediate
pathway to recompetition. Head Start grantees are expected to operate high-quality
programs and provide services in compliance with the HSPS. Grantees and its delegates
are expected to establish a process for monitoring to ensure compliance. Moreover,
programs are expected to self-identify areas needing corrective actions to ensure
compliance with HSPS. Annually, Head Start programs are required to conduct a process
of self-assessment to determine areas needing quality improvements in addition to
developing programmatic goals. Grantees are expected to provide documentation of their
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self-monitoring procedures and tools used to ensure the implementation of quality
programming (http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov).
Additionally, OHS monitoring reviews efforts include: (a) increased unannounced
visits for programs with identified concerns, (b) implementation of Classroom
Assessment Scoring System (CLASS) to gauge teacher effectiveness, (c) software
updates, (d) Federal Monitoring Review reports, and (e) Monitoring Protocol guides.
The Protocol. In 2007, OHS introduced the Monitoring Protocol, a
comprehensive tool which encompasses the Head Start program content areas and
includes a list of questions designed to measure grantee compliance with the HSPS.
Annually, OHS develops a new monitoring tool to guide both Head Start programs and
federal reviewers in gathering evidence regarding grantee compliance with the HSPS.
The 2012 Monitoring Protocol is divided into eleven individual guides based on the Head
Start service areas. The guides are divided as follows: (a) Program Design and
Management; (b) Fiscal Management; (c) Safe Environments; (d) Education and Early
Childhood Development Services; (e) Health Services; (f) Transportation Services; (g)
Eligibility, Recruitment, Selection, Enrollment, Attendance (ERSEA); (h) Nutritional
Services; (i) Disabilities Services; (j) Family and Community Services; and (k) Mental
Health Services (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009).
The Monitoring Protocol guides give federal reviewers direction during the
Federal Monitoring Review process regarding interview questions, observations, and
documentation review (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). All Federal
Monitoring Reviews are conducted within the context of the Monitoring Protocol.
Federal Review Teams gather data regarding grantee compliance from observations,
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interviews, and verification and analysis of grantee documents. From the data gathered
the federal review team makes initial findings regarding program compliance and
forward a full report regarding evidence gathered to the Office of Head Start (Report to
Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009).
Problem Statement
Evidence of low-performance. The most recent Reports to Congress on Head
Start Monitoring (2008 & 2009) provides evidence of the need for Congress to provide
supports to thoroughly investigate the reasons for the poor-performance of grantees
during monitoring reviews. In 2008, OHS conducted 974 monitoring reviews. Of the 974
reviews conducted, 565 Head Start grantees experienced a First-Year or Triennial Federal
Monitoring Performance Review. Interestingly, three-fourths of the programs reviewed
were identified as non-compliant. More specifically, 412 programs were found noncompliant and 27 were determined as deficient. According to the Monitoring Report to
Congress for FY 2008, of the 439 noncompliant programs, a total of 2,139 compliance
issues were cited; 95% were non-compliance findings and 4.1% were deficiency
determinations. The majority of noncompliant and deficient determinations were
associated with Program Design and Management (62%) and Fiscal Management
(47.6%) service areas. Program Design and Management services include the following
content areas: (a) program planning, (b) governing body, (c) Policy Council, d) on-going
monitoring, (e) human resources, (e) communication, and (f) recording keeping and
reporting. Fiscal management includes cost reporting, procurement, grant reporting and
compensation (http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov, 2012).
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In 2009, OHS conducted 986 monitoring reviews. Of the 986 monitoring reviews
conducted, 475 Head Start grantees experienced a First -Year or Triennial Federal
Monitoring Performance Review. Subsequently, most of the programs were identified as
noncompliant. 357 of the 475 programs reviewed were found noncompliant and 22 were
determined as deficient (Monitoring Report to Congress for FY, 2009). According to the
Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring (2009), the number of noncompliant
programs has increased since 2006. Furthermore, in 2006, 58% of Head Start programs
had findings of one or more non-compliances. In 2009, the number increased to 75.2%.
Albeit, the number of programs found deficient has decreased since 2006 from 32.8% to
4.6% in 2009. The reduction in deficiencies is attributed to the Head Start Act of 2007
which narrows the definition of a deficiency (Monitoring Report to Congress for FY,
2009).
Interestingly, of the 357 noncompliant and 22 deficient programs reviewed in
2009, a total of 1,878 non-compliance issues were cited and 38 deficiency violations. On
average four non-compliances were found of each grantee reviewed. Grantees reviewed
in 2007 and 2008 experienced a similar average of non-compliances. Grantees reviewed
in 2006 that were found noncompliant averaged six non-compliances. The majority of
noncompliant and deficiency determinations in 2009 were associated with Program
Design and Management, Fiscal Management, Safety Environments, and Education and
Early Childhood Development Services (Monitoring Report to Congress for FY, 2009).
Of the 357 noncompliant grants, 331 required follow up reviews. Notably, 22 of the
programs corrected their non-compliances immediately while the federal reviewers were
on site.
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Of the 331 grantees slated for Follow-up reviews, 80 received a Follow-up
Review and 90 received Desk reviews. Subsequently, 89% of the grantees that received
Follow-up reviews that year became compliant, 1.3% remained noncompliant, and 7%
failed to correct non-compliances and its violations were elevated to deficiencies. Of the
grantees which received a desk review, 97.8% became compliant and 2.2% failed to
correct non-compliances and its status was elevated to a deficiency (Monitoring Report to
Congress for FY, 2009). The poor performance of grantees during Federal Monitoring
Reviews demonstrates the critical need to investigate turnaround practices of Head Start
directors who have successfully improved their low-performing programs to highperforming in compliance with the HSPS and successfully achieved a Federal Monitoring
Review with no findings.
The examination of the current turnaround literature presents a gap in the ECE
field, more specifically Head Start programs. This gap validates the need for future
research to investigate Head Start programs experiencing performance decline and in
need of recovery. Turnaround literature has not been examined relative to early care and
education programs or Head Start. The lack of literature has created a gap and warrants
an emergence of scholarship to investigate causality of Head Start program decline and
leadership’s capacity for turnaround efforts. The emergence of an intervention plan for
programs enriched from lessons learned from Head Start directors that have provided
evidence of successful turnaround will assist early care and education leaders in gaining
greater cognizance of symptoms of performance decline and strategies to remedy
performance issues. Head Start administrators will benefit from informed research to
build a capacity for a successful turnaround. This effort will minimize the potential of
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performance issues plaguing Head Start programs threatening the continuity of quality of
educational services for children. There is an urgent and critical need to conduct research
that informs Head Start grantees with strategies and documented successful models of
programs moving from a state of low-performance to higher performance. It is important
to create discourse in the literature about Head Start agencies experiencing performance
decline and their recovery process documenting the steps of corrective action to
achievement of program compliance.
The field warrants a comprehensive examination of common themes in noncompliance issues, whereas the cycle of recompetition is bound to continue and Head
Start children are threatened with a loss of continuity in quality Head Start services.
Theoretical Rationale
Turnaround theory. To date there is not a documented model of turnaround
strategies in the early care and education (ECE) field or Head Start programs. Studies of
successful and unsuccessful attempts of turnaround are analyzed in the for-profit sector,
not-for-profit, public sector, and schools. These studies offer detail on the stages of
turnaround and the steps necessary to move an organization from a state of failure to
recovery. Within the literature, turnaround is theorized in three ways: As a “condition”
(Armenakis, Fredenberger, Cherones & Field, 1995, p. 231), as a “process” (Short,
Palmer, & Stimpert, 1998, p. 155) and as a “consequence or end state, of successful
strategic actions” (Short, Palmer, & Stimpert, 1998, p. 155). Turnaround efforts will
result in two divergent end states: failure or recovery. (Hager et al, 1999; Slatter, 1984;
Stewart, 1984).
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School turnaround. There is an abundance of literature on turnaround theory in
the corporate sector (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Barker & Mone, 1998; Bibebault, 1992;
Castrogiovanni et al., 1992; Francis & Desai, 2005; Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Lohrke
& Bedeian 1998; Oviatt & Bruton, 1994; Schendel & Patton, 1976) and more recently an
expanded body of literature that includes turnaround of for-profits, churches, hospitals,
public organizations, and schools. There is an absence of research that investigates the
turnaround practices implemented by Head Start directors. Subsequently, the researcher
substituted K-12 turnaround literature as there are similarities in accountability structures
and federal mandates. Accountability systems created by the government imposed onto
organizations is not exclusive to Head Start. School improvement has been a federal
focus since the 1994 Improving America’s School Act. The Improving America’s School
Act was a weak attempt to hold schools accountable for poor performance. Under the
Bush administration, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 imposed penalties to
schools deemed as low-performing by the Department of Education due to low test scores
and poor student achievement. Under the 2001 NCLB Act, schools are subject to
sanctions for low-performance. Like Head Start, factors that outline the causality of lowperformance in schools are not definitively defined, but are often attributed to poverty
stricken neighborhoods. NCLB is the impetus for many initiatives at the federal and state
levels to improve schools and implement turnaround strategies (Duke, 2012).
Increasing high-performing schools are the focus of the reauthorized NCLB Act
under President Obama’s administration. With a new era of accountability, lowperforming schools are forced to develop a strategy to improve or face reductions in state
funding or closure. Moreover, NCLB includes a provision that specifies that schools that
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lack evidence of adequate yearly progress (AYP) for two consecutive years will need to
develop an improvement plan, provide professional development for staff using Title I
funds, and offer families the option of transferring to another school. If the school
demonstrates three-years of deficiency by not meeting AYP, tutoring and afterschool
programs must be offered to students. Furthermore, if the school demonstrates four-years
of failing to make AYP, the school district is required to implement an immediate
corrective action strategy. The strategy must be selected from a federally approved list.
Strategy steps must include hiring an expert to advise the school, reduce the school’s
management authority, replace staff, restructure, and update the current curriculum. The
most severe corrective action step is imposed if a school demonstrates five years of
failing to make AYP. Consequently, the school is either closed or reopened after
replacing all staff, managed under a charter, and the management of the school is
contracted out (Herman et al., 2008).
The federal government has invested in school turnaround attempts by providing
funding and developing policy which mandates school turnaround. There are several
competitive initiatives designed to fund school turnaround. President Obama’s Race to
the Top fund offers 4.35 billion dollars to support education initiatives including school
turnaround. Investing in Innovation grants provides 650 million dollars to support school
improvement including innovation related to turnaround. Additionally, school
improvement grants provide funding to schools willing to subscribe to one of four
prescribed turnaround models (Herman et al., 2008).
Race to the Top. Race to the Top outlines four models of school turnaround: (a)
Turnaround Model, (b) Restart Model, (c) Transformation Model, and (d) School
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Closure. The Turnaround Model includes replacing the principal, replacing most of the
staff, implementing a strong strategy including restructuring governance, and
implementing a research based curriculum to improve student outcomes. The Restart
Model includes opening the school under new management. The new management team
is selected from a competitive and arduous process. Like the Turnaround Model, the
Transformation Model includes principal replacement, but focuses on teacher
professional development and extending teacher planning times, longer school days for
students, and additional supports including community engagement. The Closure Model,
requires that the school is closed and the students are redirected to a higher-performing
school (Kutash et al., 2010). There is a paucity of research to document the sustainability
of success of in any of the school turnaround models (Murphy, 2008).
Turnaround models are derived from practices and models from the business
sector, albeit the success of school turnaround is not as well documented as business
sector turnaround. There is a paucity of literature that is demonstrative of successful
school turnaround. A large majority of the literature details the strategies implemented by
principals or districts to turn low-performing schools into higher performing successful
schools. There is very little empirical research that documents the successful turnaround
interventions and much less literature that lends itself as a guide to the sustainability of
the successful turnaround.
Turnaround support is not limited to the federal government. There are many
groups that are invested in the success of school turnaround strategies. Unfortunately,
there are a large number of failing schools. Many states and school districts have invested
in improving student outcomes. States are developing accountability models to
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formatively access school efficacy and school district performance. Moreover,
Universities have invested in turnaround by creating programs to develop principals as
turnaround specialists. Bargaining unions have supported turnaround by updating union
contracts to include provisions to terminate teachers in schools deemed in a turnaround.
This effort offers school districts the flexibility to make the necessary staff changes to
implement turnaround interventions. Charter schools provide turnaround support by
becoming the solution to empty school buildings. More often, charter schools are or
selected to manage schools when districts engage in the Restart Model. Additionally,
through philanthropy efforts, turnaround initiatives are supported at the national and local
levels (Kutash et al., 2010).
Despite the growing support for turnaround efforts there are barriers to achieving
widespread school turnarounds. States and districts are limited to turnaround expertise.
Consequently, districts are limited because there is a scarcity of highly qualified experts
that can document mastery in turnaround interventions. School districts are still
developing the capacity to monitor and assess turnaround efforts. The uniqueness of
turnaround requires districts to set up new infrastructures to ensure appropriate
implementation systems in addition to successful turnaround interventions. Therefore,
there are limited turnaround leaders and teachers experienced in turnaround. Moreover,
there are limited universities that offer turnaround training, thereby, limiting the pool
highly qualified staff to lead turnaround efforts. Other barriers to turnaround include the
limited availability of management organizations that specializes in turnaround. This
barrier will limit states selections to three of the four approved turnaround models
(Kutash et al., 2010).
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Interestingly, some critics blame the education policies that create accountability
systems for low-performance of schools. Notably, Levine and Levine (2012) criticize No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) and Race to the Top (RTTT) for the cycle of chronic lowperformance in K-12 settings. Under NCLB, low achievement scores are reasons to close
or restructure schools; similarly, in Head Start programs, grantees that perform poorly
during the Federal Review risk losing their Head Start Grant, consequently, another
organization may apply for its grant to provide Head Start services in the existing
grantee’s community. Levine and Levine (2012) argue that low student achievement
extends beyond low test scores and teacher accountability. They describe social factors
that are attributed to low student achievement, for example, inequitable school resources
in poor and more affluent communities. Furthermore, the critics posit that crowded
schools and rapid growth are all attributes to low student achievement.
Additionally, Levine and Levine (2012) proffer systems of accountability
modeled after business practices are creating unintended consequences like student test
scores correlating with teacher performance, therefore creating an incentive for schools to
cheat. The researchers assert that more businesses are investing in education due to the
millions of dollars in funds available to corporations for developing software and tutoring
services. Many private corporations are benefiting from business turnaround models
intended to benefit the education of students. Levine and Levine (2012) argue that the
turnaround model is “destructive to public education” (p. 113). Moreover, they posit
replacing the turnaround model with individualized instruction and eliminate the business
model trajectory. Whereas the researchers critique the turnaround model as an
intervention for failing schools, they claim districts have limited influence over the
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implementation of turnaround as a model for improvement strategy. Moreover, the
turnaround model is driven by federal mandate under President Obama’s Race to the Top
(RTTT) initiative.
At the Head Start level, there are no documented models of turnaround to choose
from. However, there are organizations that take over grants of chronically lowperforming Head Start programs and ensure that children have access to Head Start
services. These programs have a specialized capability to put in place a team of staff to
ensure children have a Head Start program to attend without interruption. Community
Development Institute Head Start (CDIHS) based in Denver, Colorado is funded by OHS.
CDIHS provides interim services when a Head Start program grant is relinquished,
suspended, or terminated. CDIHS is awarded a new grant at the same funding amount as
the former grantee. According to CDIHS, they provide a staff of highly qualified
consultants to support and continue Head Start program operations. Existing staff of the
former grantee will need to reapply for their jobs and begin the hiring process as new
employees. CDIHS will typically serve as the grantee for one year until a replacement
grantee is selected (http://www.cdiheadstart.org).
Organizational change. Organizational change is described by many scholars as
a dynamic multifaceted process. Scholars posit that organizational change is categorized
as either emergent or planned (Burnes, 2004b; Cummings & Worley, 2001; Pettigrew,
2000). Emergent change is a process that derives from ongoing variations within the
organization that occur and create change without intention (Pettigrew, 2000). Often in
the nonprofit sector the impetus that drives change is unplanned. Factors that drive
change are typically demands by regulatory bodies, shifts in the field, or change in
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funding warranting the development of a planned strategy. In Head Start, OHS is the
impetus for change in low-performing programs.
The notion of planned change has been adopted in both the for-profit and not-forprofit sector (Medley & Akan, 2008). The theory of planned change is first introduced by
Kurt Lewin (1947) and described as intentional planning for change developed
throughout multiple stages. Lewin (1947) developed a three-step planned change model.
Lewin’s planned change theory was utilized in the not-for-profit and social sectors
(Cummings & Worley, 1997) to help understand and conceptualize planned change.
Lewin’s theory was later applied in organizational development theories (Burnes, 2004b;
MacIntosh and McLean, 2001). Lewin’s (1947) three-step model is described in as
follows: (a) unfreezing, (b) changing; and (c) refreezing. During the unfreezing stage, a
process is developed to eliminate old unwanted behaviors and learn new behaviors. In the
changing stage, people are motivated to change and learn new behaviors. In the final
stage, refreezing, participants adapt to the new behaviors and commit to sustain the
organizational change.
Kotter’s eight-stage change model. Kotter’s (1996) book Leading Change
provides a framework for leading planned change. Furthermore, the model illustrates the
importance of the change leader and their action steps implemented during the change
process. Kotter’s (1996) change model builds on Lewin’s (1947) three-step planned
change model. Although the book is intended to guide the business for-profit sector, this
model is applicable to any organizational change. Kotter (1996) posits that there is an
eight-stage process necessary to lead successful sustained change within any
organization. The change model employs the following steps:
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1. Establishing a sense of urgency
2. Creating the guiding coalition
3. Developing a vision and strategy
4. Communicating the change vision
5. Empowering broad based action
6. Generating short-term wins
7. Consolidating gains and producing more change
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture
Kotter (1996) suggests that following this sequential multi-stage process is
important to leading successful change. The author delineates that it is critical that the
stages are followed in the requisite sequence to ensure the overall success of the
transformation. According to Kotter (1996), change cannot be accelerated by skipping
steps in the change sequence. The author asserts that critical mistakes within stages can
stifle organizational transformation. Kotter describes vulnerability and crisis as triggering
mechanisms for change. The eight-stage change model is the guiding framework that
will be employed in this study to analyze the change process of Head Start directors
leading low-performing programs to high quality performing programs.
The first four steps of Kotter’s (1996) change process moves the organization out
of a state of complacency with the status quo. This phase is modeled after Lewin’s (1947)
unfreezing stage. Likewise, steps five, six, and seven models Lewin’s (1947) changing
phase, by creating shifts in culture and change unwanted embedded organizational
behaviors. The final stage borrows from Lewin’s refreezing stage and ensures that the
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change is sustained by illustrating positive shifts in organizational culture. Kotter
describes successful change as demonstrating sustained behavior change (Kotter, 1996).
In the first step, Establishing a sense of urgency, Kotter (1996) delineates that
leadership defines what the future should look like, aligns people with the vision, and
inspires them to actualize the vision despite obstacles (Kotter,1996). The leader must
communicate the urgent nature of the need for change. Staff will not only require an
awareness of the problem, but the data that demonstrates the need for the turnaround. The
team must understand that complacency and the current state of the organization will lead
to organizational failure.
In the second step, Form a powerful guiding coalition, Kotter (1996) asserts that
the leader needs to develop a team to guide the activities to achieve the intended solution
for change. This team must develop a set of shared values and continually grow the
support of staff. The author avers that hierarchy should not matter and that champions of
change are not hierarchal. Moreover, that it is more important that the guiding coalition is
strong enough to lead the change (Kotter, 2007). Change efforts begin with a leader and
grow throughout the team. The guiding coalition will inspire others to action by clearly
communicating the vision.
Step three, Create a vision Kotter (1996) states that at this phase the leader
communicates the transformation strategy and defines the vision for the desired state of
the organization. Furthermore, vision is what drives the change and keeps the activities
and changes aligned with the desired state. In step four, Communicate the vision, the
leader uses all opportunities to ensure that staff are aware and understand the direction of
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the vision. Additionally, all staff should be clear on the vision and direction of the
organization.
In Kotter’s (1996) fifth step, Empowering others to act, the leader must ensure
that the team has the resources and support necessary to carry out the vision. During stage
six, Generating short term, Kotter (1996) asserts that short term wins offer the change
agent feedback that their strategy is on the right track. Subsequently, it provides the team
the motivational inspiration to push towards the goal. Kotter argues that short term wins
encourage others to join in on the mission and believe that its goals are achievable.
Moreover, short term wins minimize the power of doubters and naysayers (Kotter, 2007).
In step seven, Consolidate improvements and produce more change, the change
agent must motivate the group to continue its momentum and drive change. Kotter (1996)
warns, claiming a premature victory can be detrimental and demotivate staff.
Furthermore, the team should know that they are on the trajectory of achieving the vision,
thereby, understanding that the vision is not actualized until the end ultimate goal is met
and the new behaviors are sustained.
The final stage requires the leader to Institutionalize new approaches. The author
delineates that successful change is demonstrated when organizational behaviors have
taken root and become established as norms and the team illustrates shared values.
Moreover, staff clearly understand the benefits of the change and illustrate an acceptance
of new norms and that reverting back to old behaviors are detrimental to the livelihood of
the organization.
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Statement of Purpose
President Obama’s reform of Head Start appears to regulate like the NCLB of
Head Start. Obama’s mission is to ensure children have the best opportunities for school
readiness. The Obama administration plans to increase the accountability in Head Start
grantees that are chronically low-performing by enforcing recompetion as a solution for
low-performance. Forcing grantees to reapply for their Head Start grant and allow higher
performing programs to vie for their grant. Turnaround involves a concerted effort to
understand the reasons why the program is failing before executing a series of solutions
(Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Congress needs to recognize the current condition of
programs. Moreover, identifying common non-compliance issues will caution grantees
and developing the appropriate improvement plan informed by research will prevent
grants from suffering from the same conditions of non-compliance. Absent from the
turnaround literature are the voices of Head Start directors that have experienced the
condition of non-compliance and documented steps to move from a non-compliant state
to the high-quality program performance.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the turnaround practices as identified
by Head Start turnaround directors that improved their low-performing programs and
transformed the programs to full compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards
to achieve a successful Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. Subsequently, the
research will provide a road map to guide grantees plagued by noncompliance, whereas
increasing opportunities to operate within the guidelines of program compliance, in turn,
guaranteeing more children access to high quality Head Start services. Additionally, the
threat of recompetion and the recent increase of low-performing Head Start programs
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present an urgent need to focus on identifying the turnaround strategies employed by
Head Start directors who facilitated successful organization change.
Research Questions
The following research question guides this study:
What do Head Start Directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards, consequently achieving a
successful federal review with no findings?
The study explored the unique action steps of six Head Start turnaround directors
and their actions steps towards program improvements. This study details their process of
organizational change as described by the Head Start turnaround leaders. The interview
protocol was designed to reveal the turnaround practices and gather if the practices
implemented by the participants modeled any of the steps in Kotter’s (1996) Leading
Change eight-step model.
Summary
Head Start was developed to serve preschool children in poverty to increase
opportunities for academic success. Head Start grantees are governed by OHS and
subjected to the HSPS, a set of standards designed to ensure Head Start programs are
continuously operating high-quality programs. Recently, many grantees have
demonstrated a failure to maintain full compliance with the HSPS as documented in the
2008 and 2009 Federal Reports to Congress on Head Start Monitoring. The reports
indicate that grantees have demonstrated an increase in non-compliances during recent
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federal reviews. Grantees that operate outside of the HSPS are deemed noncompliant and
thereby low-performing. It is vital that Head Start provide high-quality programs.
Turnaround literature is prominent in business literature, more recently there has
been an emergence of literature related to turnaround in K-12 settings. Regrettably, there
is not a documented model of Head Start turnaround practices in early care in education
field, more specifically Head Start. Therefore, the current research study addresses the
gap within the field. The threat of low-performing Head Start programs, presents a
critical need to investigate the practices implemented by Head Start directors who have
successfully facilitated their programs transformation from low-performing to highperforming subsequently, achieving a federal review with no findings. This study is
particularly relevant as it introduces the field to Head Start turnaround practices.
Many Head Start programs are threatened with performance decline and poor
monitoring reviews. It is important that Head Start administrators are armed with the
tools to analyze organizational factors that lead to performance decline and implement a
successful strategy to correct concerns. The lack of documented research to guide
improvement efforts in Head Start programs, presents a risk of a chronic system of
failures among agencies and continuity of services for children. Unlike schools, there is
an absence of turnaround models to choose from to support Head Start grantees. The
understanding of turnaround strategies in low-performing Head Start programs will help
programs achieve program improvements and HSPS compliance.
In the literature review that follows, the researcher will examine school
turnaround literature and provide evidence of the absence of scholarship to document
turnaround in early care and education programs. This discourse will set the stage to
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demonstrate the need to develop the methodology described in Chapter 3, to conduct a
research study to understand the experiences of Head Start directors who have
successfully transformed low-performing Head Start programs. In Chapter 4, the results
are presented. The Chapter delineates the study findings into four major themes as
derived from the data of six interviews with Head Start turnaround directors. Chapter 5
provides a discussion and interpretation of the results, and includes implications of
findings, in addition to study limitation, recommendations for future research and
concludes with a summary of the entire dissertation.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Introduction and Purpose
Chapter 2 offers an overview of the empirical and theoretical findings related to
turnaround in K-12 settings. The literature offers discussion and strategies for K-12
settings, but research does not suggest turnaround practices, leadership competencies, and
approaches for early care and education, more specifically Head Start directors. In sum,
none of the existing turnaround research previewed examines the practices of early care
and education leaders to turn low-performing Head Start programs to high-performing
programs.
For purposes of this study, the researcher will use the definition of turnaround by
the Mass Insight and Research Institute (2007): “ a dramatic and comprehensive
intervention in a low-performing school that: a) produces significant gains in
achievement within two years; and b) readies the school for the longer process of
transformation into a high-performance organization” ( p.8). Turnaround differs from
typical improvement efforts that focus on actions to recover over time. Turnaround
suggests dramatic and quick change efforts by administration to prevent closure or other
high stake interventions (Public Impact, 2007). This study will interview six Head Start
directors who have successfully turned around their low-performing programs using the
HSPS as criteria for high-performance and subsequently achieved a Federal Monitoring
Review with no findings. The study is guided by the following research question:
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What do Head Start Directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards, consequently, achieving a
Federal Monitoring Review with no findings?
Kotter’s eight-stage change model is the guiding framework that will be
employed in this study to analyze the change process of Head Start directors leading lowperforming programs to high-quality performing programs.
The literature search strategy commenced with a Google Scholar search of key
terms, Head Start turnaround and Head Start improvements, and the researcher yielded no
research relative to the improvement or turnaround practices of Head Start programs. The
results were expanded to school turnaround in which the researcher found literature
relative to public school turnaround in the K-12 setting. Education Research Complete
and Academic Search were the primary databases utilized to gather literature published
between 2000 and 2012. Literature sources included peer reviewed and other journal
articles, as well as independent reports developed by research centers, and published
books.
The research studies presented in this chapter detail lessons learned in successful
turnarounds in K-12 settings across the United States. This literature review is organized
logically to synthesize the literature according to three distinct sections: (a) the role of
the district, (b) principals as agents of change and (c) leadership competencies needed to
facilitate the successful school turnaround. These sections will be followed by a
discussion of the fidelity of these turnaround strategies to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage
change model. Interestingly, none of the studies offer a specific prescription that
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guarantees the successful turnaround and most importantly, all of the literature reviewed
fails to examine turnaround strategies of directors in Head Start programs.
Review of the Literature
To date, Head Start turnaround has not been the subject of scholarly literature.
The researcher will rely on school turnaround literature as there are similarities in the
settings. This viewpoint is crucial to the study because it is primarily focused on lowperforming schools and the efforts taken to turn around the entities. The school
turnaround literature offers valuable lessons of successful school improvement and an
analysis of factors that influence school turnaround. Turnaround leaders analyze,
diagnose, and then develop a turnaround plan. The leader establishes a sense of urgency,
implements quick actions, and executes short term goals (Murphy, 2008).
The research on school turnaround is limited because it is generally qualitative
and consists of case studies of schools that have successfully improved their performance
(Public Impact, 2007). School turnaround research emerged in the late 1990s, and there
are several scholars that have contributed to the leadership on school turnaround literature
(Duke, 2006; Fullan, 2006; Leithwood, Harris, & Strauss, 2010; Murphy & Meyers,
2008). Much literature is derived from cross-sector research on turnaround practices and
analyzed to create a framework for districts and schools to develop turnaround plans
based on research and best practices to transform chronically low-performing schools
(Fredrick & Gift, 2009; Herman et al., 2008; Murphy, 2008;). Much of the turnaround
research provides evidence that turnaround efforts are not sustained and often student
achievement regresses, school re-culturing energies diminish, and improvement efforts
are limited ( Duke & Landahl , 2011).
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School turnaround models. Turnaround models used in schools are derived from
practices and models from the business sector, albeit the success of school turnaround is
not as well documented as business sector turnaround (Meyers, 2008). According to
Meyers (2008), there is a paucity of literature that is demonstrative of successful school
turnaround. For example, in a study conducted by Aladejem, Birman, Orland, HarrRobins, Heredia, Parrish, and Ruffini (2010) approximately 1,000 low-performing
elementary schools were examined to recognize schools that demonstrated drastic and
continued improvement, only 47 schools met the criteria. Moreover, the researchers
assert that few schools within the U.S. demonstrate dramatic and sustainable
achievements. Much literature details the strategy implemented by principals or districts
to turn low-performing schools into higher performing successful schools. However, little
empirical research documents the success of turnaround interventions and much less
literature lends itself as a guide to successful turnaround (Meyers, 2008; Public Impact,
2007).
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) is the impetus for many initiatives at the federal
and state levels to improve schools and implement turnaround strategies (Duke, 2012).
In addition, President Obama’s reform of Head Start also has regulations that can identify
low-performance and threaten a program with closure. Obama’s stated mission is to
ensure children have the best opportunities for school readiness. The Obama
administration plans to increase the accountability in Head Start grantees that are
chronically low-performing by imposing the concept of recompetion and forcing grantees
to reapply for their Head Start grant and allow higher performing programs to vie for
their grant (http://www.whitehouse.gov, 2011).
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At the Head Start level, there are no documented models or studies of turnaround.
With the threat of recompetion and the increase of low-performing Head Start programs,
the field has an urgent need to focus on identifying the organizational change process and
turnaround strategies employed by Head Start directors. These leaders are faced with the
task of guiding their programs from a state of low-performing to high-performing Head
Start programs, but not much is known about what they actually do to make the
turnaround happen.
The role of the district. External forces are the impetus for school turnarounds.
Similar to Head Start, K-12 settings are guided by a hierarchal system of regulations.
Turnaround mandates begin at the federal level, and are cascaded down from the state
and local level to the district. School district leadership has the critical role in developing
the turnaround direction, and district led initiatives could lead to the success or failure of
the turnaround strategy. Murphy (2008) provides an overview of turnaround literature
employed from his study of turnaround in corporate, nonprofits, and government
organizations in an effort to provide insights for schools in need of a successful
turnaround. The researcher posits that turnaround leaders should analyze the reasons for
decline and then develop a turnaround plan. Districts actions should include quick
actions, which include evaluative actions to gauge the problems and tighten cost.
Moreover, Murphy (2008) provides insights for school turnaround. He posits that
turnaround leadership should focus on efficiencies, organize and understand the need of
the customer, understand the causes of decline, and change the school principals and
provide support for the new leadership.
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The district determines who will lead the turnaround effort at a specific school
and the financial and professional development support that will be provided for the
turnaround leaders (Public Impact, 2007). Murphy (2008) asserts that changing
management can include changing strategy or employing consultants to support the
current leader. The school district determines if the current principal will continue or if a
new principal will lead the turnaround initiative. Several turnaround studies suggest that
principal replacement is necessary to lead the successful turnaround (Murphy, 2008;
Rhim, Kowal, Hassel, & Hassel, 2007). Several private sector scholars posit that
changing leaders is critical to the success of the turnaround effort (Abebe, 2009; Barker,
Patterson, & Mueller, 2001; Pearce, 1992). In a later section, a study by Duke (2006) is
previewed. The researcher interviewed fifteen schools leaders and delineates that ten of
the school districts replaced the principal as the first step in the turnaround process. In
contrast, school turnaround research has not documented that principal replacement is
necessary to the success of the turnaround effort (ED, 2004). However, Duke (2006)
delineated that all schools experienced a change in leadership practices regardless of
principal replacement. According to Murphy (2008), most for profit organizations
recover by replacing the CEO and the top management team. The researcher delineates
that in most cases of organizational turnaround successful leadership is viewed as the
critical facture. He posits that leadership provides the sense of direction. The scholar
distills that right leadership does not always warrant leadership change, albeit, this is the
most common practice.
Interestingly, three authors provide critical insights as to the role of school district
leadership in guiding the turnaround process beyond principal replacement. Kowal and
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Abliedinger (2011), Public Impact (2009), and Robinson and Buntrock (2011) espouse
the importance of communicating with stakeholders and informing them of quick,
dramatics improvements that happen early on that indicate the strategy is working.
Whereas demonstrating small wins quickly build stakeholder support for the turnaround
strategy. All of the authors recommend providing turnaround principals the autonomy to
make decisions is critical. Additionally, removing the complexity of red-tape and
providing them the flexibility to terminate or deploy staff that fails to support the vision.
The researchers are in agreement and do not have any contrasting arguments. The issue
of principal replacement is addressed, but current literature is absent of significant data to
support either the concept that replacing or retaining a principal to guide the turnaround is
critical to the successful strategy to sustain turnaround. All of the researchers’ findings
are consistent with one another (Duke, 2006; Kowal & Abliedinger, 2011; Public Impact,
2009; Robinson & Buntrock, 2011).
Kowal and Ableidinger (2011) provide guidance for states, school districts, and
principals on the leading indicators of school turnaround based on research from business
and health sectors. Kowal and Ableidinger define leading indicators as early
demonstrations of success. The researchers build on the scholarship of Hassel and Hassel
(2009) which demonstrates the successful leadership actions of turnaround leaders.
Similarly, the scholars posit that early signals offer leaders feedback as to strategic
direction indicating what is going well and areas that need a change in strategy.
According to Kowal and Abliedinger (2011) successful turnaround leaders focus
on small wins early and use it to gain momentum. The researchers contend that
turnaround leaders need the autonomy and flexibility to develop their team. Hassel and
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Hassel (2009) describe this as the “big yes” whereas the leader is given the support to
make decisions that will lead to quick improvements. Kowal and Abliedinger’s (2011)
posit that turnaround leaders develop a vision and strategies with activities that are
aligned with the goal and employ communication activities to regularly communicate the
vision and goals with the staff and leaders. Furthermore, turnaround leaders empower
others to act by removing organizational barriers to achieve the vision. However, as
turnaround leaders recognize failed actions, consequently they eliminate activities that
are not producing the expected outcomes and invest in activities that are doing well.
In another study, Public Impact (2009) provides seven steps for district leaders to
achieve the successful turnaround based on cross-sector research. The researchers posit
that district leaders should commit to the successful turnaround by providing ongoing
support to school staff and community stakeholders. Public Impact (2009) delineates that
districts should prepare for multiple attempts at the turnaround process, consequently,
new efforts may require a new principal. The researchers aver that the district’s decision
of determining which schools will be considered turnaround schools and the intervention
strategy are critical to the successful turnaround. Additionally, the researchers assert that
districts must develop a pool of turnaround principals that possess the leadership capacity
and turnaround strategy to eliminate the cycle of poor performance. Similarly, Kowal and
Abliedinger (2011) and Public Impact (2009) argue the importance of providing
turnaround principals the support and autonomy to make staffing decisions, in addition to
holding them accountable for results. Both studies determine that, districts must
recognize the importance of selecting the right teachers for turnaround schools and ensure
they possess the skills needed to support the turnaround.
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Robinson and Buntrock (2011) examined the turnaround strategy of Cincinnati
Public Schools. The researchers determined that turnaround begins with the district and
the turnaround “leaders must be supported and held accountable by a strong
infrastructure” (p. 8). The authors contend that there must be clearly established
objectives and a plan to monitor performance. Similarly, Kowal and Abliedinger (2011)
and Public Impact (2009) posit that turnaround principals must have the autonomy to
remove obstacles to goal achievement. Likewise, the authors contend that principals are
critical to turnaround success, and furthermore they motivate culture changes, develop
strategy-focus and lead the change process.
Robinson and Buntrock (2011) delineate that districts need highly qualified
turnaround principals to guide the improvement strategy. Robinson and Buntrock (2011)
argue of the limited number of turnaround principals and recommends that school
districts seek turnaround leaders from sectors outside of education. Additionally, the
researchers note the importance of the district communicating with stakeholders.
Interestingly, Robinson and Buntrock (2011) and Public Impact (2009) detail the
importance of including stakeholders in the improvement process. The researchers
contend that community support can positively benefit turnaround efforts and minimize
naysayers who may try to challenge turnaround efforts. All of the authors previously
cited contend that the school districts role is important to beginning the successful
turnaround strategy. School districts make critical decisions about the selection of the
principal; they provide autonomy, engage stakeholders, and hold turnaround leaders
accountable.
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Interestingly, Head Start directors do not report to the school district. OHS and
congress mandate that all Head Start programs operate within the HSPS. Subsequently,
the Federal Government awards funds directly to grantees to provide high-quality
programming. When Head Start programs are low-performing, OHS mandates that
grantees take immediate action to improve the program and often provide technical
supports. However, the grantee is required to ensure the program is operating within full
compliance with the HSPS (Zigler & Styfco, 2010). The grantee holds the Head Start
director accountable to ensure that changes are made, whereas, the school district would
hold the principals accountable for the successful turnaround. In this next section, the
researcher will provide scholarship that emphasizes the critical role of the effective
turnaround principal as change agents.
Principals as change agents. Turnaround research emphasizes the importance of
effective leadership to guide the successful turnaround (Leithwood & Strauss, 2009;
Murphy, 2008; Steiner & Hassel, 2011; Thielman, 2012). The principal selected by the
school district to head the turnaround school must guide and set the strategy. Albeit, the
district will set the stage for the turnaround and prepare and remove barriers to strategies.
Evidence of successful principal actions during the turnaround process informs research
about effective principal leadership behaviors. The significance in the role of the
principal as a change agent is demonstrated in the work of Duke (2006); Theilman
(2012); Duke and Salmonowicz, (2011); Tucker, Salmonowicz, and Levy (2008);
Murphy and Meyers (2009); and Duke and Jacobson (2011). The researchers detail the
behaviors and actions of successful turnaround leaders. Tucker et al., (2008) emphasizes
the importance of turnaround training programs and provides evidence that principals
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trained as turnaround leaders demonstrate greater successes than of principals that were
not formally trained as turnaround leaders. Conversely, Duke and Salmonowicz (2011)
fail to provide evidence that the turnaround principals demonstrated incomparable
performance. The implications of turnaround principals that emerge from the literature
provide evidence that there are similarities in the actions of successful turnaround
leaders.
Duke (2006) contends that there are similarities in leadership behaviors within
turnaround schools. The researcher studied fifteen schools that sustained turnaround
improvements. All the participating schools were elementary schools. Nine of the schools
were studied during 1997-1998. Of the remaining six schools, five were studied in 2004
and the remaining school was studied over the period of 2004-2005 (Duke, 2006).
Inclusion criteria for the study required that the schools must have completed a
turnaround. Duke (2006) documented the improvements demonstrated by the fifteen
turnaround schools and developed a set of changes he identified as critical to their
turnaround success.
Duke (2006) delineates that all principals developed a mission that was motivated
by a core belief. Additionally, Duke identified similarities in the strategies implemented
by the principals in the turnaround schools examined. They are: (a) a vision that children
can be educated; (b) teamwork; (c) shared focus and accountability for the success of
each student; (d) data decision making; (e) distributed leadership; (f) expanded learning
time and experts support for students needing additional help; (g) collegial teams to plan,
assess, determine student progress, curriculum and intervention strategies; (h) data
sharing; (i) staff professional development; and (j) family and community engagement
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(Duke, 2006). Additionally, the principals examined reported that other leadership
changes included: (a) mission and focus, (b) style of leadership, (c) re-culturing, and (d)
distributed leadership.
Duke (2006) described changes made by 12 of the turnarounds principals to
reinforce changes in school culture. Nine of the principals removed staff that lacked the
capacity to help students improve their academic performance. Individuals were deployed
to other schools, counseled out of the field or motivated to retire (Duke, 2006). The
researcher delineates that turnaround principals cannot lead turnaround efforts alone, and
that the leadership functions must be distributed. The turnaround principals included
teachers as part of the leadership functions. All 15 turnaround schools demonstrated
evidence of improved teamwork among staff which included regular sharing of
instruction strategies and the development of vertical and horizontal teams. Duke (2006)
states that future research should include extending studies that substantiate
characteristics of successful K-12 turnaround and develop a curriculum for turnaround
leaders. Interestingly, the author does not provide a context that includes turnaround in
early care and education settings, more specifically Head Start programs.
Similarly, Thielman (2012) provides an account of the efforts of a principal’s
leadership actions while facilitating the successful turnaround in a catholic high school.
Unlike the turnaround case examined in Duke (2006), this turnaround effort was not
motivated by Department of Education or other external forces. This turnaround effort
was initiated by the principal and teachers committed to improving curriculum and
teaching practices (Theilman, 2012). Theilman (2012) posits that regardless of the
external impetus for improvement, the successful turnaround is driven by the internal
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efforts. Theilman’s (2012) case study documents the efforts of the principal and core
team to drive the improvements within the high school.
Most of the literature on school turnaround focuses on elementary and middle
schools (Ferguson et al., 2010). Several scholars posit that high schools are more
difficult to reform than elementary schools (Duke & Jacobson, 2011; Ferguson et al.
2010; Thielman, 2012). High schools are typically larger than elementary schools, and
the internal division often serves as impediments to the success of high school
turnaround. Furthermore, past academic failures of students, ages of high school students,
lack of parent involvement, behaviors, and absenteeism all serve as factors that hinder the
success of high school turnaround (Duke & Jacobson, 2011). However, Theilman (2012)
provides evidence of a successful high school turnaround. Similar to Duke (2006) the
study principal established a core belief among staff that they students they served had
the capacity to learn and make academic improvements (Theilman, 2012).
It is important to examine the leadership behaviors to document the successful
practices implemented by principals engaged in turnaround strategy. In another study
examining principal behaviors, Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) examined the first year
turnaround efforts of a principal in a low-performing school. Duke (2006) provides an
overview of actions of 15 principals. This study examined the decisions made by one
turnaround principal. This exploratory qualitative case study is of a first year elementary
school principal leading a turnaround. The principal was interviewed via email or in
person. The scholars employed a decision making conceptual framework to analyze the
data. The Duke and Salmonowicz ( 2010) research was guided by the question: “How
does a new principal begin the process of turnaround in a low-performing elementary
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school?” (p. 38). Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) posit that principals make key decisions
related to “performance, policies, program, process and personnel” (p. 39). More
specifically, when there is resistant staff not in support of the mission. Principals often
make difficult decisions when they lack the support or flexibility to hire or terminate staff
as needed. Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) delineate that the participant relied on beliefs
to make critical decisions. Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) posit that there are critical
lessons from their research. The authors contend that decisions made by principals were
from judgments that lacked a process system for forming the best response. Principals
lacked time for exploration of alternative options to resolve critical dilemmas that arise.
Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) delineate that principals need to understand the
reasons for failure and pose critical questions about low-performance issues, where to
focus efforts on intervention programs and the appropriate design and when to eliminate
unsuccessful invention efforts in order to possess the capacity to conduct turnaround.
Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) proffer that turnaround principals would benefit from
training to support leaders in “good decision making” (p. 56). Interestingly, the
participant principal was trained as a turnaround specialist. The researchers posit that
turnaround leaders need to understand the environment in which they make decisions and
reflect about the costs of the decisions made. Limitations to this study include the small
sample pool and the inability to generalize findings. Additionally, this study is limited to
elementary schools and fails to mention efforts to turnaround low-performing Head Start
programs. Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) demonstrate the critical decisions made by
turnaround principals and the need for specific training to support turnaround leaders.
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The studies examined thus far guide the reader in understanding that there are
specific skills warranted of individuals leading K-12 turnaround. The following studies
will preview the specific skills of turnaround leaders and the importance of targeted
training programs to prepare principals with the competency skills necessary to lead as a
turnaround principal. Over the years training programs have been developed to meet the
increased demand for turnaround principals in low-performing schools (ED, 2004).
Tucker et al., (2008) found that turnaround training programs have a “positive influence
on leadership activities and outcomes” (p. 31). The authors found that principals who
participated in turnaround training programs achieved better turnaround results than
principals that did not. Similar to the work of Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) the authors
examined principal leadership behaviors on a larger scale, specifically in 20
underperforming schools. Of the twenty schools interviewed 10 principals completed a
turnaround specialist program and the comparison group had not. On the contrary, the
principal examined in Duke and Salmonwicz (2010) had not completed a turnaround
specialist program. The purpose of the study were to define the leadership actions
demonstrated by principals to improve student achievement, identify measures of student
achievement, and examine any differences in the change process as described by leaders
in low-performing school who completed specialized turnaround and principals in
comparison schools.
During the 2004-2005 school year, the 20 participating principals were
interviewed twice. The researchers’ interview protocol included two semi-structured
interviews. Student data from year end state assessments were collected from all students.
Ten participants were offered formal turnaround training and support to aid in the success
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of the turnaround efforts and the other ten principals had not been offered turnaround
support. Notably, Tucker, et al., (2008) found similarities in the practices and beliefs of
the turnaround principals and the non-turnaround principals. The researchers found that
both groups of principals demonstrated a high value on teamwork and partnership,
commitment to increasing test scores, and data-driven decisions. Similarly, the
leadership practices mentioned by principals were: (a) benchmark testing, (b) actively
analyzing data, (c) after-school remediation, and (d) on-going communication with staff.
Interestingly, the research found that 19 of the 20 participants stated that teamwork was
highly valued component of the change process. In contrast, the student’s assessment
scores demonstrated significant differences in the two schools. The math and English
scores of the elementary students lead by turnaround specialist surpassed those of the
comparison schools. Interestingly, eighth grade scores did not demonstrate substantial
results and there was only one eighth grade school in the study. The researchers proffer
that there are commonalities in turnaround practices.
According to Tucker et al. (2008), the students who attended schools led by the
turnaround specialist demonstrated better test results in 2005 than students in the
comparison schools. The researchers attribute the improvements to specialized
turnaround training, communication of the mission to stakeholders and community, and
ongoing and regular support. The researchers posit that turnaround specialist trainings are
beneficial and have a positive influence on principal leadership actions and goals. Also,
future research must take into account the importance of improving school cultures and
its relationship to turnaround practices. Although this study offers a comparative
narrative of the successes of turnaround principals, the study fails to include turnaround
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practices of leaders of in early care and education programs, consequently, the field lacks
research relative to the leadership actions of Head Start directors turning around lowperforming programs.
Notably, re-culturing is important task in the turnaround initiative in poor
performing schools. Tucker et al. (2008) recommended future research to examine
culture and its relationship to turnaround practices. Murphy and Meyer (2009) present
data on the importance of reculturing in turnaround. The researchers provide a narrative
about critical elements necessary for the successful turnaround drawn from their preview
of the corporate, government, and nonprofit fields. The researchers establish that people
are critical to the success of a turnaround. Likewise, leaders of turnarounds must
understand the attitudes of their employees as they, in turn, impact the culture. Negative
and toxic cultures cannot sustain a turnaround. It is important for turnaround leaders to
change the culture by restoring confidence by empowering the team, through
collaboration, engendering respect, and recognizing the contributions of the staff. Other
researchers for example, Fullan (2007), examines the importance of re-culturing in the
improvement process. Similar to Fullan (2007), the researchers support the notion that
principals must employ influencing and motivational skills to change the school culture,
and furthermore, must establish an organizational shift in how employees view their work
(Fullan, 2007; Murphy & Meyers, 2009).
Murphy and Meyers (2009) engaged in a study of cross-sectional literature to
develop a comprehensive model for successful organizational turnaround. The authors
suggest that the leader begin by recognizing early warning signs of crisis, and then
mobilize the team to focus on the mission and remove barriers to achieving the mission.
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The researchers proffer that employees are motivated by a vision of organizational
success, increased opportunities to participate, challenges, shared successes, and
recognition of success. Additionally, the researchers assert that leader should engender
transparency by communicating good and bad information about the organization,
thereby building trust and momentum (Murphy & Meyers, 2009).
According to Murphy and Meyers (2009), leaders can empower people by
building teams and training staff. Similarly to Tucker et al. (2008), the authors posit that
organizational culture has a critical impact on the likelihood of sustaining the turnaround.
Furthermore, turnaround leaders help develop new organizational norms and create shifts
in employee behaviors. They do this by challenging the current situation, demanding a
positive change, and warranting a commitment from all staff. The researchers contend
that turnaround leaders develop, a vision that the organization can change its path and
improve, they commit to high standards, and a continuous process of ongoing
improvement that that leads to increased successes (Murphy & Meyers, 2009). The
dissertation research questions will probe for further exploration of how Head Start
directors motivate and empower staff during the turnaround process in Head Start
programs.
In another study, evidence of successful turnaround implemented by principals
includes the work of Duke and Jacobson (2011). Duke and Jacobson (2011) examined
the success of two Texas High School turnaround situations. Duke and Jacobson (2011)
contend that there are several leadership characteristics shared by the principals. Both
principals shared a focused strategy on improvements with small wins insight; the
courage to terminate staff not committed to the goal developed the support from the team.
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Similarly, both principals built relationships with the middle schools and a focus on data
to drive decisions regarding next steps for academic supports for students. Furthermore,
both principals balanced improvements and monitored to eliminate barriers to continuous
improvement. A significant difference in the turnaround efforts is that Weiskopf was a
new principal and selected new staff to help lead the efforts unlike Garza. Limitations to
the study include efforts to sustain the turnaround implemented by principals are not
examined.
Current literature details the importance of examining the behaviors and actions
of successful turnaround leaders. The absence of research to document the behaviors and
actions of Head Start leaders guiding turnaround demonstrates the critical need to
facilitate a study that will provide evidence of such practices. The early care and
education field needs literature to document the actions of Head Start leaders that
transcend programs from a point of low-performing to quickly improving. The literature
review examines the action steps taken by competent turnaround leaders. It is critical to
examine the unique competencies of turnaround principals. The next section of research
suggests that turnaround leaders possess a unique set of competencies to lead the
successful turnaround.
Turnaround leader competencies. Turnaround leaders possess a unique set of
skills that differ from principals that are successful in general school settings. Notably,
the research presented by Duke and Jacobson (2011) alludes to the fact that there are
unique competencies of turnaround leaders. According to Public Impact (2007)
turnaround leaders must possess the competency and knowledge base to guide the
dramatic improvement. Turnaround literature argues not to assume that principals of
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high-performing schools possess the capacity to successfully lead a turnaround school
(Kowal & Hassel, 2011). Turnaround principals possess a critical set of competencies to
successfully lead a turnaround strategy (Kowal & Hassel, 2011).
Turnaround principal competencies are unique, in comparison to typical
principals leading high performing schools. Public Impact (2008) guides this concept by
delineating that there are four unique core competencies of successful turnaround
principals. Kowal and Hassel (2011), Aladjejem et al. (2010), and Herman, Dawson, Dee,
Greene, Maynard, Redding, and Darwin (2008) build on the research of Public Impact
(2008) and their research expounds on the concept of core competencies needed to guide
the successful turnaround. According to Public Impact (2008) turnaround leader
competencies represent “patterns of actions” hence, overlap in turnaround leader
competencies and actions (p. 4). Public Impact (2008) developed a guide to identify
competencies for principals in leading the successful turnaround. Much of the literature
contends that turnaround principals drive results (Public Impact, 2008; Rhim, 2011;
Steiner & Barrett, 2012). Public Impact (2008) scanned cross-sector turnaround literature
and derived from their research that there are a set of core competencies to successfully
lead turnaround (Public Impact, 2008). The researchers contend that there are four
“clusters” of leader competencies. They are: (a) driving for results, (b) influencing for
results, (c) problem solving, and (d) showing confidence to lead.
In the first cluster, driving for results, the turnaround leader will set high
performance goals and develop a system to prioritize and monitor goals and activities.
Turnaround leaders take risks, set clear expectations, and plan for hiccups and crisis with
a clear plan to deal with issues before they occur. In the second cluster, influencing for
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results, the turnaround leader focuses on creating a coalition to support and influence
others. Moreover, the turnaround leader builds morale and empowers the team with a
clear vision and ongoing professional development. Next, in the problem solving cluster,
the turnaround principal demonstrates competencies in resolving conflicts. Finally, in the
showing confidence to lead cluster, turnaround leaders visibly demonstrate the
confidence and a commitment to the mission and vision of the turnaround (Public Impact,
2008).
Turnaround leader competencies are enacted in combination with critical action
steps. Public Impact (2008) posits that there are three critical actions of competent
turnaround leaders: (a) identify and focus on early wins to gain momentum; (b) dismantle
organizational norms by creating discomfort with status quo and eliminate patterns that
impede success; and (c) respond rapidly to measured outcomes, eliminate failed
strategies, and sustain focus on progression. Additionally, Public Impact (2008) proffers
that there are 14 additional actions in combination with leader competencies that leads to
the successful turnaround: (a) collect and analyze data; (b) make action plan based on
data; (c) concentrate on big, fast payoffs in year one; (d) implement practices even if it
requires deviation; (e) require all staff to change; (f) make necessary staff replacements;
(g) focus on successful tactics; halt others; (h) do not tout progress as ultimate success; (i)
communicate positive vision; (j) help staff personally feel problems; (k) gain support of
key influencers; (l) silence critics with speedy success; (m) measure and report progress
frequently; and (n) require decision makers to share data and problem solve (p. 6).
Identifying the competencies and actions demonstrated by turnaround principals is
critical to guiding the success of future turnaround schools. Whereas, the researchers
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provide evidence of the capacities necessary for successful turnaround leaders, they fail
to provide evidence of the steps necessary for Head Start directors to guide lowperforming Head Start programs to high-performing programs.
Similarly, Kowal and Hassel (2011) provide evidence of turnaround competencies
as found in the work published by Public Impact (2008). In contrast, the researchers posit
that there are shortages of leaders to guide turnaround in chronically low-performing
schools. Kowal and Hassel (2011) posit that there is not a large supply of available
leaders that possess the competencies necessary to guide the successful turnaround
outside of the education field. The authors posit that there is a paucity of talent, and argue
that turnaround leaders should be imported from cross-sector into the education field.
According to Kowal and Hassel (2011) successful turnaround leaders focus early
on small wins and use it to gain momentum. They develop a vision and strategy aligned
with activities that ensure goal achievement. Turnaround leaders improve communication
by sharing the vision and goals with the staff and leaders. Furthermore, turnaround
leaders empower others to act by removing organizational barriers to achieve the vision.
However, as turnaround leaders recognize failed actions, they eliminate activities that are
not producing the expected outcomes and invest in activities that are doing well.
Moreover the researcher asserts that, turnaround leaders are driven by the data. They
drive momentum, while building credibility. Turnaround leaders develop goals after
critical analysis. They are motivating and communicate to all stakeholders about the
success of the turnaround. The researchers contend that open communication among
stakeholders is effective for reducing the effects of cynicism.
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Kowal and Hassel (2011) proffer districts struggling to find competent leaders to
should look to secure talent from other fields. The researchers suggest further study on
the benefits of importing leaders from other sectors as turnaround principals.
Interestingly, Kowal and Hassel (2011) identify the benefits of selecting leaders from
other fields to guide the successful turnaround strategy, however, the researchers fail to
address the gaps in knowledge about early care and education directors and the
techniques used to guide low-performing Head Start programs to a state of improvement.
Turnaround literature supports the argument that specific competencies are
required of leaders in order to achieve turnaround success (Kowal & Hassel, 2011; Public
Impact, 2008). Notably, Aladejem et al. (2010) found that principals that did not
demonstrate competencies still achieved improvements. Aladejem et al. (2010)
conducted a retrospective qualitative study to document 11 schools that demonstrated
improvement during the school years of 2000 through 2005. The schools either
demonstrated slow improvement, within three and five years, or rapid and dramatic
improvement within one to two years. Eight of the schools were determined as rapidimprovement schools and the remaining three were designated as slow-improvement
schools. Aladejem et al. (2010) aver that principals that achieved less turnaround success
were more management type leaders and focused less on the change process. Principals
that focused on the change process implemented quick strategies and reinforced the
improvement through re-culturing efforts. According to Aladejem et al. (2010) most of
the study’s principals employed distributed leadership strategies. The researchers
delineate that the implementation of distributed leadership practices were critical to their
success.
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Aladejem et al. (2010) proffer that the turnaround principals distributed leadership
styles included engaging staff in developing instructional policies and supporting data
driven decisions. Study principals demonstrated competencies in motivating employees
and setting high expectations for staff and pupils. Furthermore, Aladejem et al. (2010)
posit that study principals focused on student outcomes, developed consistent school
procedures, and improved the culture by enforcing a belief that change was of urgent.
Limitations to this study include the small sample size of eleven schools and none of the
school examined were Head Start programs.
Similarly, Herman et al. (2008) demonstrate the commonalities of successful
turnaround leaders. Herman et al. (2008) analyzed turnaround literature derived from ten
turnaround case studies. The studies included a combination of 35 schools, six high
school, eight middle schools, and 21 elementary schools. The case studies examined
represent turnaround research during the school years of 1999- 2005. The purpose of the
study is to analyze ten case studies to provide similarities and findings to provide strong
evidence of successful turnaround competencies. Herman et al. (2008) preface the study
delineating that all of the case studies examined provided low evidence to support the
significance of the data. Despite the low significance levels, the researchers deduced from
the study commonalities in successful turnaround leadership. Similar to work of
Aladejem et al. (2010), the researchers found commonalities in the practices of
turnaround principals specifically, in developing a clear vision and expectations. The
principals developed a culture of change renouncing status quo and setting high goals of
all staff and mandating their commitment to the change process.

48

Turnaround principals enforced the message that everyone must change.
According to Herman et al. (2008) new principals analyzed data about student
achievement before creating changes. The researchers contend that the turnaround plan
must be ground in data and analyzed to ensure the appropriateness for the change
initiative. Herman et al. (2008) posit that the turnaround principals studied and
eliminated barriers to change. Additionally, the principals monitored staff and pupil
performance and were more accessible to manage student behaviors in addition to
observing classroom instruction.
Interestingly, Herman et al. (2008) delineates similar findings to the work of
Aladejem et al. (2010). Both studies found that the principals employed distributed
leadership practices engaging staff and other stakeholders. According to Herman et al.
(2008) all participants established goals related to teaching instruction and establish
procedures to regularly monitor progress. The researchers posit that turnaround leaders
develop successful strategies by establishing one or two short term goals that are highly
achievable. Once the goals are achieved, turnarounds leaders declare quick wins by
publicly announce the accomplishments of the strategy. The researchers assert that
highlighting quick wins will gain parent confidence in the success of the strategy and
minimize the effects of naysayers (Herman et al., 2008).
Herman et al. (2008) provide evidence of commonalties in turnaround leader
competencies and actions in alignment with other turnaround studies (Aladejem et al.,
2010; Public Impact, 2008). The researchers contend that this study offers low-level
evidence, however argues that the study provides strong recommendations to lead to the
likelihood of the successful turnaround strategy. Albeit, the researchers provide evidence
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of turnaround commonalities, they fail to examine the cohesion of successful practices of
Head Start directors’ turnaround around low-performing Head Start programs to
improved high-performing programs.
The research studies presented in this chapter describe the role of the district,
principals as change agents, and the specific leadership competencies needed to facilitate
the successful K-12 turnaround in schools. The school district sets the turnaround
strategy by analyzing the causes for low performance before prescribing the turnaround
strategy. The district selects the right leaders, ensures autonomy for the principals to
make critical decisions, and provides the appropriate professional development and funds
to support the turnaround at the school.
The literature provides evidence that principal action steps are complex and
crucial to the successful turnaround. Most importantly, the principal begins with
developing a vision and gaining buy-in from all stakeholders. Furthermore, the literature
provides evidence that turnaround principals demonstrate similar actions. Their actions
and competencies are unique to principals of their kind. Consequently, it cannot be
assumed that principals currently leading high performing schools will successfully
turnaround low-performing schools. Turnaround principal demonstrate a unique set of
competencies. There are four core competencies of turnaround principals: (a) driving for
results, (b) influencing for results, (c) problem solving, and (d) showing confidence to
lead (Public Impact, 2007). Interestingly, the core competencies are aligned with Kotter’s
(1996) eight-stage change model. This model is tightly aligned with the leadership
actions and competencies of turnaround leaders reviewed in this chapter. Despite, the
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alignment with Kotter’s (1996) change model the literature fails to document evidence
relative to Head Start directors.
Examining the literature according to Kotter’s model. The literature reviewed
demonstrates the breadth of coverage relative to turnaround leadership. Albeit, the studies
examined fail to demonstrate turnaround practices in Head Start whereas it guides the
researcher in developing a framework to examine the phenomenon of Head Start
turnaround. This section summarizes the relationship between Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage
change model and the variables that provide evidence of successful strategies for
turnaround and major variations, if any, in the strategies reviewed.
Step 1 of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model requires Establishing a sense
of urgency. Making staff changes, requiring all staff to change, and the mandate for
quick and dramatic change are evidence of actions that validates turnaround leaders’
establishment of the sense of urgency in the nature of turnaround. Actually, the fact that a
school is engaged in turnaround represents the sense of urgency. All of the studies
examined in this literature review document the sense of urgency. Some studies signal the
sense of urgency by making changes to leadership. The concept of changing principals is
discussed in several studies as a signal to stakeholders that a change was necessary.
Frederick and Gift (2009) proffer that guiding the turnaround with a new
leadership strategy is beneficial. In contrast, Murphy (2008) warns that many weak
turnaround strategies include retaining the existing school leaders. In the research by
Theilman (2012), the researcher examined two principals who achieved success in their
turnaround strategy. One principal was a new leader and the other principal was the
existing principal and retained to facilitate the turnaround. Interestingly, Murphy (2008)
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delineates that there is point where school recovery is unattainable regardless of
leadership replacement.
Turnaround literatures asserts that the leader must establish a sense of urgency,
and implement quick actions that include evaluation to understand the problems and
reduce, a process to develop and execute short term goals ( Murphy, 2008). Turnaround
principals must develop a strategy that resolves where to focus intervention efforts and
when to eliminate unsuccessful intervention efforts. These competencies are necessary to
conduct a successful school turnaround (Duke & Salmonowicz, 2010).
Much of the literature examined supports Kotter’s (1996) Step 2, Form a Guiding
Coalition (Public Impact, 2008; Murphy & Meyers, 2009; Tucker et al., 2008; Duke &
Jacobson, 2011). The researchers support the idea of building a team to guide the vision,
moreover, they posit that all staff must commit to the change. Similarly, the literature
supports Kotter’s (1996) Step 3, Create a vision, as most of the literature examined
provides evidence of the importance of developing a vision. Duke (2006) establishes that
turnaround leaders establish a mission and focus. Similarly, Hassel and Hassel (2009) and
Kowal and Ableidinger (2011) document the importance of developing a mission and
focus to the successful strategy.
A number of the studies examined provide evidence of support for Kotter’s
(1996) Step 4, Communicating the change vision (Herman, 2012; Public Impact, 2008;
Public Impact, 2009; Rhim, 2012). Turnaround leaders communicate the message to all
stakeholders that there is a need to change. Interestingly, Theilman (2012), Duke and
Salmonwicz (2010), Hassel and Hassel (2009) and Kowal and Ableidinger (2011) all
provide examples to support Kotter’s Step 5, Empowering others to act. For example,
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Duke and Salmonwicz (2010), Public Impact (2007), and Public Impact (2008), discuss
the importance of removing staff that do not support the vision in addition to removing
obstacles to achieving the change. Similarly, Duke (2006) asserts that principals must
have the autonomy to remove staff that fails to support the vision. Negative and toxic
cultures cannot sustain a turnaround. It is important for turnaround leaders to change the
culture and restore confidence by empowering the team, collaboration, engendering
respect, recognizing the contributions of the staff (Murphy & Meyers, 2009).
Recognizing successes and contributions of staff are in alignment with Kotter’s
(1996) Step 6, Generating short term wins. Many studies mention the importance of
establishing small wins during the early stages of the turnaround process ( Hess & Gift,
2009, Kowal & Ableidinger, 2011; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Additionally, Duke and
Jacobson, (2011) and Kowal and Hassel (2011) reported the advantages of highlighting
small wins. The authors posit that generating small wins increases momentum,
documents the successes of the strategy, diminishes the power of naysayers, and
encourages buy-in with stakeholders to support the turnaround strategy. In contrast, Duke
(2006) did not report findings that emphasized the importance of generating short term
wins. None of the studies provided explicit evidence of the need to develop small wins.
Kowal and Hassel (2011) provide evidence to support Kotter’s (1996), Step 7,
Consolidate improvement and produce more change. Turnaround leaders eliminate failed
efforts and focus on successful strategy efforts. Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) research
found that Turnaround principals’ strategy included a focus on successful intervention
efforts and they knew when to eliminate unsuccessful intervention efforts. Turnaround
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leaders focus on data and monitor progress regularly to gather when to eliminate failed
efforts (Kowal & Hassel, 2011).
Finally, several studies provide evidence to support Kotter’s (1996) Step 8,
Institutionalize new approaches (Herman et al., 2008; Hassel & Hassel, 2009; Kowal &
Hassel, 2011; Murphy & Meyers, 2009; Public Impact, 2007, Public Impact, 2008).
Tucker et al. (2008) in particular, emphasized the importance of re-culturing to create a
culture that supported student learning. Re-culturing was documented to create new
organizational norms and change behaviors. None of the literature examined represent a
stark contrast in turnaround practices. Each article examined supports at least two of
Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. Among the studies examined, the following
studies support seven or more of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model: (a) Kowal
and Abliedinger, 2011; (b) Public Impact, 2008; (c) Hassel and Hassel, 2009; (d) Kowal
and Hassel, 2011; (e) Theilman, 2012; and (f) Herman et al., 2008. These studies reflect
support of Kotter’s (1996) change model and the actions of leaders improving chronically
low-performing programs. It will be interesting to examine Kotter’s framework and its
relationship to Head Start directors’ turnaround practices.
Conclusion
With the threat of recompetion and the increase of low performing Head Start
programs, the field has an urgent need to focus on exploring the organizational change
process within low-performing Head Start program and turnaround strategies employed
by Head Start directors who guide their programs from a state of low-performance to
high-performing Head Start programs.
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Chapter 2 provides evidence that turnaround in early care and education settings,
more specifically Head Start have not been explored in the literature and scholarly
research. This gap validates the need for future research to investigate and answer the
following question:
What do Head Start Directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards?
The researcher will interpret the data to analyze the change process employed by
Head Start directors to investigate if there is any alignment with Kotter’s (1996) eightstage change model.
The lack of literature has created a gap and warrants an emergence of scholarship
to investigate the successful turnaround of Head Start programs. Whereas the literature
has substantiated cross-sector turnaround literature, it fails to include Head Start. This
literature review substantiates the need for further exploration.
In Chapter 3 the researcher will describe the methodology for conducting research
to answer the questions regarding how Head Start directors turnaround low-performing
programs. In addition the chapter previews the design and execution of the qualitative
study. Furthermore, it details the design of the study, rationale, study participants,
instrumentation, ethical considerations, issues of trustworthiness, and process for data
analysis to report findings to the field.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction: The General Perspective
To date, there is not a documented model of turnaround application in the
literature detailing instances of troubled Head Start programs being improved.
Consequently, the existing research identifies turnaround in the context of schools,
nonprofits, churches, and organizational turnaround. The purpose of this study is to
examine the dynamics of the turnaround process in Head Start programs as described by
directors of underperforming programs that experienced turnaround and the leadership
behaviors implemented to facilitate performance improvements in full compliance of the
Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS) for Federal Review accountability.
The employment of a qualitative design guided this study in documenting Head
Start turnaround practices and created a road map for other Head Start programs to
facilitate program turnaround from low-performing and operating out of compliance to
high-performing programs operating in full compliance with the HSPS. Furthermore, the
qualitative design offered in-depth reflective insight into leadership practices, monitoring
procedures, organizational culture, and turnaround practices implemented by Head Start
directors. Currently, this phenomenon is not explored, so there is a critical need to
introduce discourse about the practices of Head Start directors as they facilitate the
improvement processes. The introduction of their respective reflections on how they
facilitated change will provide programs that are currently low-performing a road-map to
lead to improvements that ultimately benefit the children served. The researcher ascribed
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meaning from the data provided by Head Start turnaround directors as they detailed the
improvement trajectory in achieving full compliance status. First, the researcher will
provide an understanding of the turnaround procedures employed by Head Start directors.
Then, the researcher will analyze the data and to understand if the participants’ actions
reflect instances of Kotter’s (1996) model (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The research
employed the use of an open-ended interview and demographic questionnaire to gain
understanding and gather credible evidence to help answer the question:
What do Head Start directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards?
The chapter begins with a discussion of the basic tenets of qualitative
methodology. Next, the context of the study is reviewed describing how the participants
were selected and study criteria. Then, the researcher’s positionality as an insider is
explained. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the instrumentation, procedures, and
data analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief analysis of how the study
addressed reliability and trustworthiness.
A cross-case analysis offered the researcher robust data that extended beyond one
specific case but offered the researcher an opportunity to examine the practices of
multiple directors (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Analyzing the strategies, behaviors, and
specific conditions experienced by various directors increased the opportunities for
generalization and added significance within multiple cases. Additionally, a cross-case
analysis explicated the phenomenon by analyzing comparisons and relations across
numerous cases. Cross-case analysis permitted the researcher to dig-deeply to understand
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the methods employed by Head Start directors in the United States who have improved
their Head Start programs from a state of low-performance to high-performance
operating within full compliance with all HSPS for Federal Review accountability.
The study included an in-depth, one-on-one telephone interview with directors
identified from the list of the eligible Head Start programs provided by OHS. The
directors were interviewed to gain understanding about the dramatic improvements made
during the time between their most recent federal review, for the purposes of this study it
will be referred to as federal review 2 (FR2), and the review previous to FR2, in which
the program was cited for six or more non-compliances or one or more deficiency
findings, this review will be defined as federal review 1 (FR1). Additionally, participants
were asked to respond to an electronic semi-structured questionnaire to gather personal
demographic and organizational structural data. The results of the study inform the early
childhood and education field about effective turnaround strategies that can be used to
lead change efforts.
The Research Context
Participants were selected from a list generated by OHS identifying grantees that
met the study criteria. Forty-one grantees were identified as meeting the criteria. The
selection criteria for participants included: (a) each participant must be a grantee or
delegate operating a Head Start program; (b) at the grantee’s FR2, the program must have
achieved a full compliance finding; and (c) the grantee must have previously received a
finding of six or more non-compliances or one or more deficient findings from their FR1
during 2007- 2009.
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The researcher invited all eligible grantees and its delegates to participate in the
study. The participants represented Head Start grantees across 25 states: located in
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The
programs are operated by a mix of private nonprofit (n= 19), public schools (n=9),
universities (n=2), and Native-American Tribal (n=11) programs.
The Research Participants
The participants included Head Start directors who have led their programs from
non-compliant or deficient status to achieve full compliance over the past two reviews.
This accomplishment demonstrates substantial improvement in program performance.
The list of grantees that met the selection criteria provided by OHS included 41 grantees
and its delegates.
All of the eligible Head Start directors were invited to participate via email. The
selections of participants were determined by the number of respondents that agreed to
participate. A total of six programs agreed to participate. However, rich data about Head
Start directors’ competencies and action steps were gathered.
Creswell (2007) suggests deliberately sampling individuals that have first-hand
knowledge who can best inform the phenomenon being studied. For this study
purposeful sampling were employed. Interview criteria required that prior to the
interview the participant needed to confirm that they were the responsible person for the
strategy and improvement process regarding the turnaround. Subsequently, all of the
interviewees confirmed their leadership in the turnaround effort. The interviews and
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associated demographic questionnaire began in April 2013 after Institutional Review
Board (IRB) approval. The interview process commenced over four months. Interviews
were conducted from April through July 2013. The audiotaped interviews were sent to a
local professional transcriptionist for transcription. Once the interviews are transcribed
the research data coding and analysis immediately followed.
The researcher intended to collect demographic information collection from the
participants which included age, gender, race, organization reporting structure,
educational background, length of time served as a Head Start director, tenure with the
current Head Start program, current title, and specific training related to turnaround or
change management. The demographic questionnaire, found in Appendix B, was
distributed electronically prior to the initial telephone interview. In addition to the
questionnaire, the researcher requested the participant’s report of findings from FR1 and
FR2 in addition to the most recent program information report (PIR).
Only three of the six respondents completed the demographic survey.
Interestingly, several respondents did not disclose their FR1 and FR2 data and PIR. It is
presumed that the respondents did not want to share confidential documents. As an
additional challenge, it appeared that the respondents and potential participants were
fearful of identifying information being deduced from the study data to indicate
participants to OHS and staff. It is the researcher’s intent to protect respondent’s privacy
and maintain confidentiality to mitigate the risk of negative consequences. Therefore,
participants in the study are not identified. The researcher has taken care to only identify
the programs with a letter as a program identifier. The researcher does not pinpoint
specific geographic location, programmatic information, unique program traits, and

60

gender of participants in order to protect the identity of the participants. Therefore, the
contents in the demographic survey were not analyzed for the purposes in this study.
Researcher as Insider
The researcher is a former Head Start director and has worked in the capacity of a
Head Start director hired to conduct a turnaround. This relationship served as a benefit
when interviewing the participants. Whereas allowing the researcher to gain a deeper
understanding and offer opportunities for self-reflection when analyzing the data. At the
start of each interview, before the questions began, the researcher disclosed to the
participants the status as a former Head Start director. The status as an “insider” may
have offered the respondents the freedom to speak comfortably without fear or judgment.
Additionally, the participants were comfortable describing their experiences as they knew
they were engaging with someone that were aware of the nomenclatures of Head Start
and possessed an understanding of the challenges as a Head Start director. As an insider,
the researcher is fully aware of the issues that arise with program improvements within
Head Start programs. Interestingly, the researcher easily developed a rapport with the
interviewees. Likewise, the interviewees seemed to reduce inhibitions to share
information. According to Thurman (2001), the rapport between the researcher and
participant is critical to obtaining rich data.
Instrumentation
Head Start directors selected were asked to participate in one telephone interview
and complete one questionnaire to gather demographic data about the director and Head
Start program. The questionnaire was administered online, and data were collect using
Qualtrics, a web-based survey collection software. Each interview ranged between 40 and
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75 minutes long. Directors described common challenges and contextual variations which
influenced their turnaround practices. The interview questions, found in Appendix C, are
researcher-developed and based on Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model.
Standardized open-ended interviews were employed to understand the directors’
perspectives in their own words about their lived experiences regarding program
improvement. Standardized open-ended interview protocols were utilized using the same
questions for each participant. This approach was employed to increase the comparability
of responses, reduce interviewer bias, and facilitate the organization of data analysis
(Patton, 2002).
The questions on the interview protocol (see Appendix C) were designed to
ensure that it did not permit yes or no responses. The interview questions engaged the
participants to detail their experiences in their own words without limitations or
restrictions (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2003). Consequently, this style of interview is more
difficult to code due to the amount of detail in the participants’ responses (Creswell,
2007). Interview questions focused on how the Head Start turnaround directors
facilitated the change process, described challenges during the process, and the culture
and climate of the program during the change process. More specifically, the questions
focused on strategies used to facilitate the improvement process, monitoring practices,
communication, and professional development.
Only two programs released their FR1, FR2 and PIR documents for review.
Subsequently, this presented a challenge in reviewing the participants FR1 and FR2
documents. As an alternative, the eligibility listing from OHS was reviewed. The listing
contained data from FR1 and FR2 for all participants. Therefore, this information served
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as a suitable substitution for missing data and provided evidence of programs noncompliances and deficiency findings. Notably, all of the participants were confirmed by
OHS as meeting the study criteria.
Procedures
The researcher employed pilot testing of the interview questions with two Head
Start directors in Western, NY. Both directors facilitated significant improvements in
their respective programs and their input allowed the researcher to test the protocol for
timing and clarity of the question format (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003). Subsequently, no
significant changes were made to the interview protocol after the pilot interviews.
Whereas during the interview process an additional question emerged regarding fiscal
matters and was added to the Protocol, see Appendix C. Creswell (2007) suggests
employing the use of a protocol to record information and collect interview data in an
organized fashion. The protocol contains twenty-one interview questions, found in
appendix C, focused on the state of the Head Start program before the improvement
process began, the period between FR1 and FR2, and after the improvement. The
questions guided the conversation to gain an understanding of the changes implemented
by the participants that led to program improvements.
Participants were contacted via email and requested to participate. Participants
were informed of their rights and offered detailed information regarding the purpose of
the study and confidentiality. Respondents were made aware that their participation was
voluntary, confidential, and their right to withdraw from the study at any time without
consequence. As discussed previously, the names and program identities are protected
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and therefore each program is assigned a letter as an identifier. Letters A-F will be used
to identify each program.
Prior to the initial telephone interview, each participant electronically received the
demographic questionnaire and interview questions at least one week prior to the
scheduled interview. Additionally, the participants were asked to upload their FR1, FR2
and PIR. As previously mentioned, participant follow-through in this area were minimal.
The participants received an email link with access to the questionnaire for the duration
of the study. In an effort to reduce low response rates, participants received emails
informing them of the pivotal role they played in informing research to improve program
quality for Head Start children and families. Head Start directors that did not respond to
the survey received an email prompt to complete the questionnaire in addition to a second
email encouraging them to complete the demographic questionnaire. Three of the six
respondents completed the electronic survey. This presented a challenge when attempting
to analyze demographic survey data across programs. Additionally, participant
recruitment was a challenge. The researcher sent multiple emails to potential participants
in an effort to gain interest in the study. Moreover, all of the eligible participants that met
the study were contacted either via telephone or email to increase participation.
Interestingly, some potential candidates refused to participate, others did not respond, and
some respectfully declined. There were several potential interviewees that agreed to
participate, scheduled for an interview and failed to follow through with the interview.
Non-respondents were approached a second and even a third time, until a response was
achieved. However, the researcher did not always get a response.
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Graciously, six of the 41 eligible Head Start grantees participated in the study. Six
Head Start turnaround leaders were interviewed on the telephone and recorded using an
iPhone to digitally record the interview. Additionally, an iPad were utilized as a back-up
to ensure the successful recording and mitigate the risk of a failed recording. According
to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), audio recording interviews increase the accuracy in
coding. All interviews were transcribed employing a professional transcriptionist. In
seeking to ensure rigor in this qualitative study, the researcher engaged in full
transcription assuring that the interviews gathered everything that the participants said
including grammatical errors and pauses in speech. Hard copies of the transcriptions, as
well as the digital voice recording, will be maintained for a period of five years. The hard
copies of the transcription will be stored in a locked file cabinet. The data will be
destroyed after a period of five years.
Individual interviews were read twice and then categorized and coded to discover
common themes. In an effort to gain transactional validity the researcher invited the
participants to review the transcripts and agree that their perspectives were accurately
interpreted (Cho & Trent, 2006). The participants were offered one week to make any
corrections to the transcripts, and if no changes were initiated by the participants, the
transcripts were transcribed as recorded. Additionally, the researcher simultaneously
listened to each recording and matched it to the transcribed data to assure its accuracy.
Transcribed data were entered into the qualitative software program, Atlas.ti for coding
and analysis.

65

Data Analysis
All of the interviews were coded by the researcher to ensure consistency of
coding across participant interviews. Data analysis included coding and categorizing for
themes. Transcripts were coded using Atlas.ti, a qualitative software tool. The researcher
collected and analyzed the turnaround actions steps described by the study participants to
answer the research question guiding the current study. Then the researcher analyzed the
findings to determine if the Head Start turnaround directors’ actions steps demonstrated
any relationship to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model.
Analysis of the data were conducted using thematic qualitative coding. The
coding was conducted in a line by line format. Open codes were developed by reading the
text and not based on the established A priori codes. The researcher found that the A
priori codes developed limited the analysis of the data to Kotter’s change model. Open
coding helped ensure that coding was developed based on participant discourse and not
based on the researcher’s inherent biases. After open coding, axial codes were used to
categorize the open codes around dominant codes and relationships. Uniquely, the
Atlas.ti software provides the user the capability to examine the most dominant codes
based on groundedness, the number of text passages associated with a code in addition to
density, the number of codes connected to a single code. These techniques enabled the
researcher to develop multiple levels of analysis to examine the significance of codes.
After all the transcripts were coded, relationships between codes and the contextual
framework of the study were finalized and four themes emerged from the data (Friese,
2012).
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The researcher employed an internal audit to ensure consistency of themes and
categories identified in the data. The researcher conducted an internal audit and ensured
for inter-rater reliability by employing check-coding with a second coder for interviews
one, two, and three to affirm a reliable data analysis process (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
To confirm agreement between the researcher and second coder, each transcript were
coded and then inter-rater reliability checked. The first and second coder discussed the
process and codes were selected. In instances where the researcher and second coder did
not agree as to how to code a particular passage, the researcher made the final
determination. The estimated agreement established from the three rounds of coding
ranged between 85 to 90 percent.
Triangulation helps to ensure the validity of data collected (Creswell, 2007). It
was the researcher’s intention to conduct additional data analysis by demonstrating a
thorough review of the grantee’s federal review documents from FR1, FR2 and the PIR.
Unexpectedly, this data was not made available by all respondents. Alternatively, the
researcher employed other convergence methods to affirm reliable and valid data
regarding the programs studied. Participant data were compared to the federal review
data received to the data acquired from OHS in addition to interview data across
participants. Whereas it was analyzed for consistency and commonalities across the data
previewed the six participant interviews. Data that appeared contradictory were given
additional scrutiny, which included member checking. Through member checking the
researcher selected participants to verify information and add input. Additionally, the use
of a second coder increased the opportunities to reduce for inconsistencies across findings
by employing a method of cross-checking data (Huberman and Miles (2002).
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In an effort to ensure rich and robust qualitative data the researcher assured rigour
in the study maintaining an audit trail, keeping a detailed record of data collection and
analysis for confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Audit trails are useful if the
methodology changes the researcher can document the details of the change and the
rationale (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Summary
Chapter 3 provides a description of the research method, the study design,
participants, instruments, procedures, data collection and analysis and finally,
trustworthiness is discussed. Findings from this study, as well as the connection to the
research literature previewed in Chapter 2 will be presented in Chapter 4. Research study
conclusions and recommendations for future studies are described in Chapter 5.
Additionally, in Chapter 5 the researcher compares the findings with Kotter’s eight-stage
change model and makes connections to the turnaround leader actions steps. The field
needs to understand the organizational complexity, leadership behaviors, and strategies
necessary to operate high-performing Head Start programs. Therefore, it is critical to
examine the turnaround practices of leaders in Head Start programs, in an effort to not
only explicate the phenomenon of Head Start turnaround, but to increase the opportunity
to improve Head Start services for the children and families served.
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Chapter 4: Study Findings
This chapter presents an analysis of the qualitative data gathered through the
interviews with the Head Start directors who led during successful program turnarounds.
The purpose of the study was guided by the research question: What do Head Start
directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that transformed their lowperforming programs into high-performing programs that meet Head Start Performance
Standards?
The chapter is divided into four sections: (a) Organizational Noncompliance, (b)
Managing Self, (c) Managing Others, and (d) Systems Turnaround. Notably, the four
areas serve as the overarching themes for the study. In the first section, Organizational
Noncompliance, the researcher provides the context regarding the reasons the Head Start
director’s attributed to their programs non-compliant and deficiency status. The following
section, Managing Self, explores the turnaround competencies the leaders were
dependent upon to facilitate them in leading the turnaround. Next, Managing Others,
details the unique steps that each director implemented to help staff redirect their work to
ensure full compliance. The final section, Systems Turnaround, provides a summary of
the actions steps that provides evidence of the turnaround.
The results presented in this study were derived from semi-structured, in-depth
interviews with six Head Start directors across the United States. Each interview ranged
between 40 and 75 minutes long. Directors described common challenges and contextual
variations which influenced their turnaround practices. Despite their challenges all of the
69

directors dramatically improved their programs. Collectively, the six programs were cited
by OHS with 63 non-compliances and seven deficiencies. All of the directors
demonstrated common approaches in facilitating their respective turnarounds. Each
director discussed their experiences educating stakeholders about the changes within
Head Start and described how they utilized technical assistance (formal or informal) to
educate themselves about expectations and implications for compliance with the new
HSPS within their organizations.
Each program participant was assigned a letter ranging from A to F as a program
identifier, as shown in table 4.1. Programs were located across the United States. Two
programs were located in the northeastern region, three from the Midwestern region, and
one from the southeastern region. Program sizes ranged from small to large.
Table 4.1
Participant Data
Program
Identifier

Program A

Geographic
Identifier
Size of
Program
Range of
enrollment

Northeastern Midwestern Northeastern Midwestern Midwestern Southeastern
Small
program
0-300

Program B

Small
program
0-300

Program C

Large
program
600-1000

Program D

Program E

Program F

Small

Large

Small

0-300

600-1000

0-300

Organizational Noncompliance
OHS cited 63 non-compliances and seven deficiencies across the six study
programs. The Head Start turnaround leaders attributed multiple factors for their
programs noncompliant or deficient status. These reasons are categorized in four areas:

70

(a) Finance, (b) Shared Governance, (c) Human Resources, and (d) Monitoring Systems.
Interestingly, all six directors cited lack of understanding of changes made to the HSPS
after the adoption of the 2007 Head Start Act as a factor in the noncompliant or
deficiency findings.
Finance. Five of six directors agreed that the fiscal procedures and financial
matters were not their areas of expertise and subsequently were disconnected from HSPS
for fiscal operations and attributed this factor for the fiscal related non-compliances.
Four of the six the directors worked their way up the ranks with early roots as a teacher
and lacked experience working with the financial aspects of the program. The director
from Program F stated:
I kept getting phone calls from our program specialist saying you need to fix this,
why did you do this wrong, and I would go, and one time I said, I don’t do that,
the finance person does that and they said well you better figure it out because the
finance person is not responsible, the Head Start director is.
The directors discussed their previous disconnect with the fiscal matters prior to
their turnaround efforts. Fiscal managers maintained the responsibility and monitoring for
this area and shared reports and financial data with Head Start directors when requested.
Program B, summarized, “Fiscal procedures are not on my radar. I’m busy doing school
readiness calls and making sure that transportation is in line and documents are
completed. We spend very little time studying the fiscal procedure manual.” Five of the
six interviews demonstrated that the Head Start directors were reliant on the fiscal
manager for financial data and lacked the skills to monitor the fiscal content area.
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Shared governance. The turnaround leaders detailed the need for turnaround in
the area of governance. Head Start directors found that their governance procedures did
not parallel structures and functions as outlined in the HSPS. Four of the six directors
recalled the importance of ensuring that the governance component paralleled HSPS.
Head Start directors needed to understand their role in providing supports to the board in
knowing their responsibilities. Program E, emphasized the need to improve governance
processes in their program.
I remember the first time that I brought to their attention [board] that we needed a
board member that will be representing the accounting background, and then
another one who is a lawyer. We need to look for someone that is going to help us
take another look at those pieces that heads that program.
Program E’s recount provides evidence of the need to ensure the board structure is
aligned with the HSPS. The board was not clear on their role to monitor and provide
subject matter expertise in specific areas. Additionally, director’s found that the Policy
Council was weak and parent engagement was minimal.
Human resources. All participants reported that they did not have a thorough
understanding of the changes made to the HSPS after the 2007 Head Start Act.
Consequently, directors lacked clarity on subsequent changes to staff qualifications and
updates that affected other program areas. Programs were cited for expired Child
Development Associate Credentials (CDA). Staff lacked the required credentials to teach
in specific rooms. Changes to the HSPS forced changes in staff roles. The director at
program B stated, “There were all these changes that really changed the focus of service
delivery for family advocates.” Job descriptions failed to clarify expectations and failed
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to outline the appropriate educational requirements. Several directors cited their staff’s
lack of qualifications and their failure to follow established procedures despite previous
training as challenges for meeting HSPS.
Ongoing monitoring systems. Five of the six directors’ attributed a lack of
ongoing monitoring procedures as other reasons for their program’s noncompliance
status. Other reasons cited included, failure to thoroughly analyze data and failure to
follow-up on pertinent program information. One of the Head Start programs failed to
correct a non-compliance. Consequently, the non-compliance was elevated to a
deficiency by OHS. Programs were plagued with late reporting and failed record keeping.
Notably, one of the programs was threatened with a shut-down from OHS, but
successfully won the appeal and permitted to continue operations.
The Head Start programs either did not have monitoring procedures in place or
failed to understand the intricacy involved with program monitoring to ensure HSPS
compliance. One program reported that programmatic information were either not
documented, inaccurate, or not completed on time. Programs reported concerns with
integrity of the available data and their lack of documenting programmatic
accomplishments.
Program A’s director detailed her recollection reviewing the PIR report prior to
implementing the improvement plan.
If you look at the PIR from that year, there were things like 134%, and you can’t
have more than 100%. So it was just a mess and in sort of asking questions about
where the data came from, I think a lot of the data came out of people’s heads.
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Program A’s description provides evidence that the integrity of data was
questioned when metrics were inaccurate. Consequently, staff lacked an understanding of
how metrics were derived and had little information to evaluate the effectiveness of
program services. Additionally, programs reported that systems to foster continuous
improvement were not in place. The programs lacked goal follow-up and reported
concerns with timeliness and accuracy of reports. Three of the six directors indicated
concerns with service related data. The directors stated that data were gathered on an
annual basis in lieu of analyzing data at varying points of the program year to inform
decision making regarding program improvements and follow-up on trends.
Managing Self
This section examines the theme managing self. The directors’ stories provide
evidence that turnaround directors possess competencies that reflect abilities in building
inner strength and creating personal change. Drawing upon the data from the Head Start
director interviews revealed significant information related to their leadership
development in preparing for the implementation of the turnaround process. This section
describes the trajectory of the Head Start turnaround leaders as they focused on managing
themselves by engaging in preparing self and technical assistance. Interestingly, the
directors’ stories provide evidence that they engaged in formal technical assistance (TA)
and informal technical assistance while employing a strategy for program improvement.
Self-development. All of the directors discussed the importance of staying
current with new research and upcoming Head Start developments. The director at
program B detailed the importance of self-reflection and staying current on research.
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Spend some time in self-reflection and spend some time just reading… none of us
take the time, or have the time to sit down and pick up a journal and read it. Head
Start had great articles about parent engagement, to be more proactively engaged
as to what’s on that horizon, it is very difficult to balance head down time with
heads up time…turn off that computer, turn off all work, and spend some time
just reading documents trying to keep up with things.
Program E illustrated the challenges experienced by Head Start directors in
making time for self-reflections and reading journals. The director affirmed engaging in
self-development is necessary to stay current with new advances. Similarly, Program E
described her work with a life coach to support with self-reflection. “I went through
doing all these things and all of the changes, I needed a life coach… [I was] determined
and committed, but I needed to get to know myself better.” Program E’s reflection
illustrates the importance of self-development during the turnaround process. The data
revealed that Head Start turnaround leaders continuously engaged in current research and
shared the information with staff.
Technical assistance. The turnaround leaders recognized the urgency in
facilitating progression towards full compliance with HSPS and assure a successful
review. Each director began their trajectory towards full compliance in similar directions.
All of the directors focused on self-development and engaged in formal or informal TA.
Formal TA is provided through OHS or a paid consultant. Informal TA materializes in
either one or a combination of the following approaches. Informal TA included (a)
previous experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head Start
trainings, (d) attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools.
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Formal TA. Four of the six turnaround leaders received technical support
provided by OHS. Notably, the directors share contrary opinions about the helpfulness of
the support from OHS. Program B, did not find the support provided by OHS helpful. “I
can’t tell you that I think I got much in the way of consultative support,” stated Program
B’s director. In contrast, Programs E and F found the support useful, but sought guidance
from a consultant to assist with their journey towards improvement. “I just felt like she
was the answer to my prayers,” stated the director from program F as she described her
delight in working with a consultant.
So I don’t want to say that our region has not been helpful. I guess what I’m
saying is, is that some of the information is confusing and hard to understand and
I needed the consultant…a consultant who actually does more than just answer
your questions. It was a consultant that comes in and if you’re willing to open up,
looks at everything and says this is not right you’ve got to fix this, you’ve got to
fix this.
Program F described the need to have a consultant that provided individualized
support with guidance regarding non-compliance issues within the program. The director
at Program F continued her conversation and described her fear of being vulnerable with
OHS officials.
We were very leery of sharing information with people because you want to be
able to talk to your consultant and say, this is what we’re doing, is this okay and if
it’s not okay help me fix it, not tattle on me…so you need to have a consultant
that you can trust, so that’s why they said that if I was going to get a consultant I
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had to get an outside consultant who knew what they were doing and they had to
sign a confidentiality agreement.
The respondent’s board and Executive Director required her to work with a
consultant not connected to OHS. These concerns described by the director illustrate the
programs fear of sharing vulnerable performance information with OHS officials in
concern of penalties. Consequently, she hired a consultant and kept questions with her
OHS officials general. In contrast, the director at Program D detailed her experiences
working with the program specialist provided by OHS.
We’ve had the same one for the last two or three years but, you know, for the two
or three years before that we were constantly having a new grant specialist. I
finally had somebody that I was familiar with and was familiar with me which
that really wasn’t a big problem, it was just that I’m one that likes to be familiar
with who I’m talking to and once that was stabilized with the federal people then I
got to be a little bit more comfortable in asking questions.
The director at Program D was satisfied with the TA OHS provided her program.
The information provided by the Head Start directors illustrate that in addition to getting
technical support directors ask questions of people they trust to ensure they are
implementing the appropriate steps towards program compliance.
Informal TA. All of the directors engaged in some form of informal TA.
Interestingly, some directors engaged in formal and informal TA. This section details the
directors’ preparation engaging in informal TA by drawing upon one or more of the
following: (a) previous experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head
Start trainings, (d) attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools.
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Previous experiences. Three of the six directors leaned on their previous
experiences to prescribe a strategy for turnaround. The director at Program A leaned on
her prior knowledge leading a troubled program to guide the turnaround effort. She also
stated that she received specialized training from OHS some years prior to her start with
her current program. The director believed this training coupled with her previous
experiences helped prepare her for the turnaround effort. Program A illustrated, “I had
taken a program, a much larger program than this, from not being horrible but improved
them over those years. So I fell back on a lot of what I’d already done.” The director
employed her previous experiences and training to facilitate the successful turnaround
strategy. Distinctively, the respondents from Programs A, B and C drew upon their
previous experiences to support their turnaround effort. The directors from Programs A
and C had previous Head Start experience.
Support from other Head Start directors. The Head Start directors interviewed
described an informal system of support with other Head Start directors. Two directors
that hinged on previous experiences described how they combined prior knowledge along
with support from other Head Start directors to support their improvement strategy. Head
Start directors connected at conferences and local Head Start Association meetings.
Notably, four of the six directors interviewed described the importance of connecting
with other directors to learn about how other programs were responding to Head Start
changes, more specifically how other programs managed challenges in maintaining
program compliance with the HSPS. Interestingly, at conferences and local Head Start
Association meetings, directors commonly warned each other of reasons why their
programs were cited for non-compliances or deficiencies. Additionally, Head Start
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directors shared information about best practices and updates on Federal Review
experiences. Notably, the director at Program F kept a running log of citations other
programs received and used the information to develop a list of common noncompliances to guide decisions about improvements in her own program.
Everywhere I went I asked every person I knew how their monitoring review
went and what they got counted down on, and I had an ongoing list…I have five
pages of notes about things to make sure were going right that I needed to fix, or
make sure were fixed, or make sure I was doing because somebody else got
caught on it. I said what were you written up for, so what did you get written up
for, and I made sure it was done.
The director described her process for gaining information about common Federal
Review findings and utilized the information to assure her program was not cited for the
same issues. Albeit, the director stated she experienced challenge from her superiors on
making the recommended changes.
People were like I don’t think we have to do this, I mean in my agency. We’ve
been reviewed so many times before and nobody said anything. I said yes, but
this agency over here got written up for it, maybe we didn’t get caught. It’s like
saying it’s okay for me to drive drunk or speed because I’ve never been caught.
Yeah, but this person over here got caught so we shouldn’t drive drunk or speed.
The director demonstrated her trust in the guidance she received from other Head
Start directors. The director’s superiors looked for specific communication from OHS.
The respondent described her concerns with OHS communication.
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Part of the things that come from the Office of Head Start are ambiguous
sounding and they’re not really good about clarifying and they’re not sending out
policy clarifications for all the questions that people are asking, and so you have
to make educated guesses and it’s hard, so I always aired on the side of caution.
If I wasn’t sure I presented it to the executive director and the board and said
look, these people were written up for this, this is a problem, do we want to
change it or not.
The director provides evidence that turnaround leaders want to make decisions
that position their program to maintain program compliance and gather information from
directors that have experienced error. The circle of trust appears to be unique to program
directors. Four of the six directors asked questions from other Head Start Programs they
trusted to ensure the appropriate trajectory towards meeting full compliance with the
performance standards. Program B illustrated:
I remember when I went to the [local association] meetings, I remember
contacting at that time, someone based solely on the fact that her program is small
like ours, her program is rural like ours. I’m going to call and see if she would
mind helping me, and I was very lucky that I got hold of someone who was very
gracious, came to my program for an entire day… I said, I don’t know that I know
how to write a grant. I don’t know what a grant should contain, and again, that
was a different era when there was not such a fear of if I give you my trade secrets
are you going to go after my grant. But I developed a nice relationship with that
particular director and I still have contact with her. There was another Head Start
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director that I knew and is indeed a very respected director in this community that
I often would call and ask questions of.
The director at Program B illustrated the informal TA system that turnaround
leaders engaged in by contacting directors they trusted that led programs in good
standing. Interestingly, the director at Program B stated that exchanges of trade
information were more frequent prior to recompetition. Consequently, the threat of
recompetition has created a fear that other Head Start programs will compete for their
grant if they were to be recompeted. Turnaround leaders connect with individuals they
trust whether OHS officials, consultants, and other directors. Program F illustrated:
Hire somebody that’s going to help you or call another Head Start director or
somebody else, get somebody that you trust that knows what they’re doing that
will come in and open up to them enough that they can see what you’re doing
wrong, because if you’re hiding it they’re not going to be able to fix it. You have
to be willing to open up and let people see that you’re not okay in order for them
to be able to fix it.
Being comfortable with the technical assistance enables turnaround leaders to be
transparent and vulnerable in an effort to begin to recognize and fix the non-compliances.
Head Start trainings. The turnaround directors discussed the impact of engaging
in professional development either through training or learning from other programs in
good standing. Program C details the importance of attending Head Start specific
trainings.
I get so much information by attending. Head Start has a leadership institute that
they do in the fall and then again in the winter and at that leadership institute they
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tell you everything like Yvette Sanchez Fuentes was there, through the National
Head Start Association, they tell you everything that’s coming down, what you
should be doing, the reason behind everything and I attended those leadership
institutes and I just grew and in talking with other colleagues and listening to
other people’s stories, also the local Head Start Association [meetings], I became
involved in that.
The data revealed that Head Start turnaround leaders continuously engaged in
Head Start trainings and OHS Leadership Institutes.
Head Start Association meetings. Turnaround leaders connected with other
directors at local Head Start Association meetings. Four of the six directors reported their
active engagement with their local association. The director at Program F described her
active engagement at her local association meetings.
I started going to the [local] Head Start Association meetings when I would meet
in the director’s class, and I would ask questions. In fact one person said, you ask
all the questions and said you’re monopolizing the time and I thought yeah I
probably am because other people don’t have questions, but I asked questions and
we passed monitoring without findings.
The respondent described the importance of asking questions at Association
meetings and utilizing the information as a tool to support with programmatic
improvements.
OHS tools. The Head Start directors all cited the importance of using the tools
made available by OHS. All of the directors detailed the importance of staying connected
to communication on OHS’s website Early Childhood Learning & Knowledge Center
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(ECLKC). The directors illustrated the importance of actively perusing the ECLKC
website and utilizing it as a tool to get new and helpful information to remain current on
Head Start changes. Program E explained:
Finding those resources on ECKLC, you know, I realize as I go out to national
and state conferences or meetings that people don’t access the resources that are
there. I think we hear about it over and over again but people don’t actually take
the time to go and look. I think there’s something new on ECKLC almost every
week.
Turnaround directors recognize the importance of Head Start communication and
resources on the ECKLC website. Interestingly, the Protocol is a resource available on
the ECKLC website. Four of the six directors stated that they used the Protocol to help
support their program with preparing for the federal review and to monitor for
improvements. Program E explained their use of the Protocol with all program
constituents.
Print out the protocol as soon as you can and even if it’s not printed yet, get the
year prior, they’re all online and make sure that everyone has a copy or at least
part of their section, but it’s best to have the whole thing because you want to
know a little bit from others as well…you have to have the parents, board and all
of the staff, and I’m talking from housekeeping all the way to the board, everyone
needs to know what’s going on, that the review is coming and what is in that
protocol. For me I think that’s the Holy Grail as they say. That’s what they
[federal reviewers] are following and that’s what helps us along.
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Program E affirmed the benefits of using the Protocol as a tool to support
improvements and compliance. The program ensured that information was shared across
program content areas, among parents and board members. Despite their divergent
commencement steps toward full compliance each director demonstrated commonalities
in facilitating their action steps towards full compliance. Each director engaged selfdevelopment and gained technical support. The next section will detail their steps as they
utilized the skills gained to manage others.
Managing Others
The findings confirm that turnaround directors used information gained from
technical assistance to manage self and influence their decisions towards change and
target improvement efforts. After the directors gained the appropriate technical
assistance, turnaround directors demonstrated confidence to pursue and achieve
turnaround goals. The respondents developed a clear vision and communicated
expectations with staff as they led their low-performing program into full compliance
with HSPS. The directors employed their turnaround competences to facilitate their
subordinates and constituents into transforming their own self-interest into concern for
shared goals. The turnaround directors provided important lessons on how to manage
others during the turnaround. All of the directors affirmed that they encouraged
participation from their subordinates, parents and board. The directors shared power and
information, enhanced staff skills through professional development, and helped staff to
develop shared goals. Program Director A provided her recollection regarding staff
commitment.
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One of the factors for success had to be that there was this sort of core committed
staff that wanted, that believed in the program that wanted it to work...There was
a real commitment to compliance, to quality, and so staff were willing to change,
they were willing most all of them knew that there was something not right...I
mean for the most part people were from the cooks through teachers, to
everybody else, were committed and they wanted it to be successful and they
wanted the program to be recognized. I mean there’s probably, the usual like 10%
that don’t care much about anything.
The study participants contend that there are challenges in gaining staff
commitment to support the new direction. Notably, the director from Program B, detailed
her experiences with staff that lacked commitment to the goal.
I say all the time don’t ever say one bad apple won’t spoil the whole bunch,
because one bad apple will destroy you. And one person was and I use the term
she became toxic and I attempted so many times, I do believe in staff intervention
and staff support, and staff growth, let’s groom you to be a better employee rather
than just toss you out, but we could not get there.
The turnaround leaders highlighted the challenges faced with staff during the
change process. Turnaround directors confirm that not all staff commit to the vision and
often staff decided to leave the program. The turnaround leaders illustrated the
importance of reculturing to overcome the effects of turnover and to gain staff support.
Reculturing. The turnaround leaders focused their efforts on reculturing by
building relationships with staff in effort to shift the culture from this is how we have
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always done it to a culture of accountability and staff compliance. The director at
Program F describes the challenges of engaging staff in a cultural shift.
Some of them [staff], especially the new people, bought in almost immediately,
and they just started working at it. There’s a couple of staff that were resistant the
whole time. We’ve been, we’ve done it this way before, it’s never gotten us in
trouble, there’s no sense in changing now. Then there were the others that didn’t
want to change it and resented it but did it anyway.
The directors demonstrate that staff must be coached through the change process.
One example of the shifting the culture and the importance of relationship building is
described by Program A’s director.
We all knew we had past baggage whether it was scars from all the big changes
we had to make that year, whether it was scars or fears over job changes, but if we
were going to move this agency forward we needed to be a cohesive unit. So we
invested a good day and a half to two days really focused on that, before we ever
began to really unearth this stuff that needed to be taken care of.
The director engaged the staff in a retreat to uncover issues and work towards
healing and cohesiveness. Similarly, Program E utilized the support of an organizational
coach to engage the management staff in monthly retreats in addition to reorganizing to
ensure the appropriate structure for compliance. Each director ascribed their efforts to
changing culture and building relationships very differently. Three of the six directors
described reculturing efforts and relationship building to include staff retreats.
At first we had some staff that have been here longer than me and I remember
hearing this is not broke why are we going to try to fix it. This is the way we’ve
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always done it. The staff really weren’t happy with change… We really had to try
to stay the course and work on helping them understand why the change was
necessary and I think that was something that we just never really did was share
the Performance Standards with the staff, here’s the standard, here’s what we
have to do, here’s the change that’s coming.
Turnaround leaders implemented efforts to reculture that included steps to gain
staff support. All of the turnaround leaders assured that staff were aware of the
performance standards and received communication about changes. The Head Start
turnaround leaders ensured that staff had access to policies. At one program the director
placed all of the policies on-line but quickly learned that the bus driver and other staff
that did not have access to internet lacked access to the policies and procedures. She
corrected the change by creating operating guidelines that were accessible to all staff.
“We were very proud that we had converted every policy to a PDF and had uploaded it to
our website and we love that and the federal review team that came loved that, but our
bus driver would not.”
The respondent believed that creating an electronic version of the policies would
provide easier access for staff. She and her team recognized the importance of making
policy binders available for staff that did not have access to computers or were not
comfortable navigating policies electronically. Turnaround leaders demonstrated that all
staff must have access to policy documents to ensure alignment. Each director made
reference to the importance of aligning staff to support the vision. The respondents
gained staff support by providing professional development opportunities and ensuring
staff understood the implications of the change process. The turnaround directors made
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gains in shifting staff attitudes. Program A described the attitudinal shift at her program.
“There was more of a sense of accountability that things are focused on the performance
standard versus the way that we’ve always done them.” The turnaround directors
nurtured a culture of accountability.
Communication. The turnaround directors engaged staff in regular
communication which included staff meetings to ensure staff were aware of new
developments. The director from Program B described why she decided to have regular
monthly staff meetings. “In reviewing how did these simple errors that really were just
simple human error happen? That became one of the possibilities that maybe we needed
to go back to a staff meeting every single month.” The respondents demonstrated that
regular staff meetings provide staff with continuous systems of communication to
provide clear expectations and offer staff opportunities to ask questions.
All of the respondents described the importance of continuous communications.
The director at Program A described her communication at meetings. “It’s a very
purposeful, very sort of set communication on the things that we need to be on top of to
be in compliance.” She continued.
So part of our meetings now is there’s an action item list that gets updated by me
after every meeting, so things don’t drop off until they get addressed or we just
decide that it no longer is an issue or it no longer makes sense, but things just stay
on there, and I think that’s a big part of what made the changes stick in some
ways and why we keep moving forward is there is follow-up and accountability.
The respondent believed the follow-up and accountability is critical for the
sustainability of program improvements. Program A described the importance of
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turnaround leaders following up on actions items and holding staff accountable for task
completion.
Professional development. The respondents transformed their organizations to
consist of people that wanted to work collectively to achieve program compliance. The
directors supported staff work through professional development and continuous
communication. The director at program E provided a description of how professional
development is offered to staff through mentoring. “So when a staff member comes in
they also have a mentor or someone that is supporting them ongoing.” Program E
illustrated the importance of providing ongoing support to staff to assure they are
successful in their roles. Moreover, Program E provided detail on the importance of
professional development for staff. “I think spending a lot of time and effort in promoting
education for staff members, continuing education, professional development goals…so I
think quality is also investing in the staff members that work for the agency.”
Turnaround directors invested in staff training to ensure staff were competent in
meeting program outcomes. Through training and support the turnaround leaders
redefined employees work and attitudes. The turnaround leaders demonstrated their
understanding that compliance with HSPS is the sole responsibility of the Head Start
director. The respondents’ strategies included a plan to monitor the effectiveness of staff
through monitoring plans.
Monitoring plans for continuous improvement. This section details the
competencies necessary for turnaround leaders in monitoring and evaluating program
operations to ensure compliance. The turnaround leaders shared their practices improving
operations for organizational efficiency and full compliance with the HSPS. All of the
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directors interviewed detailed the importance of monitoring and ongoing efforts to
evaluate their programs, albeit each director achieved this in divergent ways. Program C
noted:
The directors of the different component areas make visits once a month and they
visit the programs, they do a report, they give it to the programs, any concerns
they have, they tell the program it has to be completed. When there’s an issue and
they feel like there’s something that could be a health and safety, they would
inform me and I would tell the program immediately it would have to be
corrected.
The respondent described the importance regular site visits and being aware of
health and safety related issues. The director at Program D, described her approach to
continuous improvement. Program D invited independent auditors to inspect her program
to ensure continuous improvement. She explained what she would say when she invited
community inspectors to audit her program. Program D’s director stated she would say,
“Come and do an inspection and let us know what we need to improve on.” She
continued:
I didn’t sit back and wait for somebody to come and find it, I wanted to find it
first, so we started getting, our fire department to come in and do our fire safety
checks periodically, we work with our food program, we have the CACFP
program and we used their reports to get better.
The respondent illustrated the importance of turnaround leaders in being proactive
in getting information about program performance. The director did not wait for OHS to
inform her of noncompliance. She invited independent auditors to monitor her program.
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Moreover, the respondent demonstrated that as concerns are identified the turnaround
leader must track and follow-up on goals to ensure the program is on the trajectory
towards achieving the goal of full compliance.
Three of the six programs discussed their use of the Protocol as a monitoring tool
to guide program improvements. The programs used the protocol to support selfevaluation and inquiry. Program E described their use of the protocol:
I think that we went through the protocol and we started preparing probably a year
in advance… If there’s something from the previous protocol that we thought was
really helpful, we continue to use it and I think that all staff is involved in that, not
just the management team, our parents, educators, family advocates, health staff,
everybody is part of going through the protocol… But staff already knows what
we’re looking for, they already know that we’re following the protocol and many
start preparing themselves, they read it and then we host discussion groups about
the protocol and we practice asking the questions and the interviews.
Program E demonstrated that monitoring is an ongoing process and effective
monitoring tools are beneficial when all staff are familiar with the tool and are aware of
expectations. Program E continued, “Questions are asked kind of like pop quizzes for the
other staff…We all have the mindset the self-assessment is coming, the federal review is
coming and be prepared.”
Turnaround directors confirm that staff read performance standards by
establishing checks or mini quizzes to ensure staff are aware of the policies and
procedures. Additionally, turnaround directors developed timelines to monitor program
goals and support staff in assuring that timelines were met. Program B explained:
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We would have a management team meeting with very clear cut delegation of
duties, very clear cut timelines and follow-up..[I would ask] did you get this done
and if the answer is no please don’t waste 15 minutes saying well but you know
here’s why, nope it’s not done let’s just change the timeline and if we can’t
change the timeline what can I do to pull you away from what you’re doing
because that has to happen.
Turnaround leaders assured timelines were met and provided staff the support
necessary to meet target dates to mitigate the risk of failure. The turnaround leaders
provided evidence of the importance of reviewing documents and supporting staff with
follow through. Program D illustrated:
We have at least three meetings with our classroom staff, it’s a staffing with them
and they have the opportunity to bring each individual file with them and they go
through the whole file with us and if there is a referral that the parents haven’t
followed up with then we will offer support on helping them help the parents.
Program E provided evidence of the importance for program directors to
demonstrate leadership that promotes inquiry and evaluation. Program E summarized:
Creating leadership to create a culture of change, a way to always promote inquiry
and evaluation…from self-assessment to just meeting to get ideas so I think any
program that continues growing and expanding and being successful is a program
that always looks at their policies, procedures and looks at what’s new, what’s
happening and takes those decisions to make changes.
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The directors affirmed that establishing regular checks to ensure staff follows
policies as prescribed is critical. The director from Program B described her process for
monitoring transportation safety.
One of our members of management team made a spot review form for the buses.
It takes three minutes and all of us, which is again that cohesiveness again... [we]
take one of those forms we brought to the bus, we step onto a bus whether it’s
here at the middle of the day or the end of the day and just a quick scan that says
number of children on the bus, is everyone in a safety seat and buckled in
properly, are all folders stored properly, any questions.
This description illustrated the importance of monitoring to ensure that staff are
following operational guidelines and performance standards. Monitoring plans also
provide targets and specific deadlines. Monitoring plans provide directors with a
continuous process of gathering staff progress on goals and program outcomes. All of the
directors discussed the importance of monitoring plans. Additionally, monitoring plans
ensure that staff do not follow policies with creativity. Monitoring plans provide Head
Start directors greater opportunities for staff accountability and compliance with HSPS.
Each monitoring plan for the respondent’s differs in detail but is common in its goal to
ensure compliance with HSPS and accuracy of data.
Systems Turnaround
The turnaround leaders provided evidence that they implemented an effective
improvement strategy for failed systems. The directors’ first steps included gaining skills
in self-development and connecting with resources to gain technical assistance. The
leaders applied the skills gained and through its application focused their turnaround
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strategy in four specific areas that showed dramatic performance decline. The four areas
are: (a) Finance, (b) Shared Governance, (c) Human Resources, and (d) Monitoring
Systems. The turnaround directors employed their skills to manage themselves and
manage others in order to make changes in the areas that were low-performing. This
section will explore the actions steps that the directors engaged in as they improved
performance. The findings revealed that there are specific competencies of a Head Start
turnaround director and their individual strategies indicate that there are commonalties in
actions steps taken by the directors to guarantee full compliance with HSPS.
Finance. The turnaround leaders made significant improvements in the fiscal
area. The dramatic turn in performance is seemingly related to the directors building an
internal capacity to learn more about fiscal processes and procedures. The leaders
confidently articulated financial matters and an understanding of their role and
responsibility to monitor the fiscal areas of the program. Five of the six turnaround
leaders reported that they gained knowledge of fiscal matters. The director at Program F
described her confidence in fiscal matters.
By the time we did the grant that year I knew how to do a grant. That grant was
done and then that finance person quit a month before we were monitored and the
week we were monitored our finance person had only been in twice… I knew
what was going on, and I was able to answer all the questions.
The respondent’s recollection demonstrated her confidence in fiscal matters and
that her dependency on finance staff for information had ended. The director confidently
answered fiscal related questions during the monitoring visit. Three of the six
respondents reported they were more aware of the fiscal aspects for the program for grant
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reporting and could confidently monitor the fiscal content area for program
improvements. The director at Program F described the skills she gained in the
turnaround process. Program E discussed the importance of connecting with the finance
staff on a regular basis.
I’m more involved with fiscal, monetary, but I think again it is a constant area that
the Head Start director, the program director has to keep up with like every week.
I talk to the fiscal department almost every day.
The respondent illustrates that turnaround leaders are intentional with connecting
to fiscal matters within the organization. The leaders understood that it was their
responsibility to ensure that fiscal matters were in compliance with the HSPS. Table 4.2
provides a summary of the turnaround improvements implemented by the directors.
Table 4.2
Finance Before and After
Prior to Turnaround

Turnaround Evidence

Directors had minimal knowledge of HSPS
related to finance.

Directors educated themselves on fiscal
areas of HSPS

Directors were dependent on finance staff
to manage and monitor fiscal matters

Directors developed competencies in fiscal
matters

Lacked clarity regarding their role with
finance related matters

Gained clarity regarding the director’s role
in monitoring and understanding finance
matters

Minimal communication with finance staff

Regular communication with finance staff
regularly

Shared governance. Directors made board members and parents feel valued
which led to greater commitment and increased parent and board engagement. Improving
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shared governance required a paradigm shift. The directors expanded professional
development to include parents and board members to make certain they were aware of
the HSPS. The directors aligned board activities with HSPS and assured that board and
Policy Committee members approved agenda items as needed. Moreover, turnaround
directors identified board and parent training needs to provide coaching and support. As a
result, the board and parents expressed interest and subsequently became more engaged
in governance activities. The director at Program A illustrated the transformation in
shared governance at her program.
So no they really weren’t involved, they’re involved now, once we got past that
initial hurdle and could really start working on like engaging parents and getting
our parent committee strong and getting our parent council strong. Now they’re
part of any discussion we have about like the sequestration stuff, how do we make
these changes, how do we make the cuts, what do we do, how do we solve this
problem, like they’re definitely a part of those conversations now.
Program A’s recollection detailed evidence of shared governance as parents were
encouraged to be part of the decision making process.
Board members were provided professional development, subsequently members
gained understanding of their roles and responsibilities in supporting and monitoring the
Head Start program. Program F detailed how the board and Policy Committee monitor
the program.
Board members are part of the self-assessment teams and so we use the
monitoring protocol from 2010 is what we’ve been using so they go through just
like they were a monitor, and say all the things that need to be fixed and then we
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do our self-assessment results and self-assessment improvement plan and then
after the improvement plan they always want follow-up answers, what was done
to fix it, how did you fix it, what still needs to be done and everything like that.
So like I said they ask questions, a lot of questions.
The board members engaged in active inquiry and demonstrated their awareness
of the implications of noncompliance, thus provided follow-up on the improvement plan.
All of the Head Start directors reported that they were accountable to the board and
dependent upon their subject area expertise to provide program support. Moreover,
directors ensured that the board composition reflected the required subject area expertise
as outlined in the HSPS. Board members and parents demonstrated efficiency when they
illustrated awareness of the HSPS and its implications on the program. As program data
improved, reports were made available to parents and board members to review and
effectively monitor. Program A detailed the changes to reporting at her program:
There’s a set report that goes out every month to staff, but also it goes out to the
board and Policy Council and it has all the elements that you have to report to the
board including numbers of meal served, why I don’t know, but that’s what it says
in the 2007 Act so that’s what we tell them. But it’s a very purposeful, very sort
of set communication on the things that we need to be on top of to be in
compliance. I’m not sure there was anything like that there prior to me getting
here.
The respondent demonstrated the shift to reporting procedures that encompassed
structured communications to assure compliance with the governance requirements
outline in the 2007 ACT. Turnaround leaders shared program goals and objectives with
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their governing board and Policy Committees, they ensured its members were aware of
the HSPS and supported the program in making improvement to gain compliance. Table
4.3 provides a summary of the improvements in the area of shared governance.
Table 4. 3
Shared Governance Before and After
Prior to Turnaround

Turnaround Evidence

Board activities were not aligned with
HSPS

Governance activities paralleled HSPS

Board members needed to gain clarity on
roles and their duty to monitor and provide
expertise

Board members provided clarity regarding
roles and responsibilities

Parents minimally engaged in Policy
Committee activities

Board members demonstrate active
engagement and knowledge of updates to
HSPS

Board members required professional
Board members provided professional
development that informed them of updates development that included information on
to HSPS
new HSPS and its implications
Directors engaged in supportive activities
to provide board members effective tools to
monitor
Board structure was aligned with HSPS
Directors monitored board composition to
ensure compliance with HSPS
Aligned board activities to support
effectiveness

Human Resources. The directors espoused their commitment to quality by
ensuring that the Human Resource functions of the organization transformed to a state of
compliance. The directors were aware of the factors for the noncompliant and deficiency
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status. The directors made immediate improvements by ensuring that all staff met the
educational requirements mandated in the HSPS. All six respondents stated they
experienced turnover within their organization during the improvement process due to
staff performance or failure to meet the educational requirements as stated in the HSPS.
As a result, job descriptions were updated to align with mandated educational
requirements. Program D described the importance of holding staff accountable for
meeting the educational requirements.
Our job descriptions clearly state what’s expected of our staff. If you’re not
qualified then are you willing to get qualified or certified, a degree if it required a
degree and if they don’t follow through with that then you have to hold them
accountable. This is what you said, this is the timeline, where are you at with
that.
The director demonstrated the importance of ensuring staff followed through with
the education plans and holding staff accountable to assure program compliance.
Turnaround leaders hold staff accountable and provide staff with clear expectations. As
roles changed, staff were provided clarity as to the implications and new reporting
structures. Program hiring practices were enhanced. Directors assured that candidates
met the mandated educational requirements prior to hire. Staff roles were redefined to
ensure operational efficiency and effective service delivery. Policies and procedures were
changed to reflect the changes in the HSP. Program D illustrated:
We went into really looking at our program plans and our policies and procedures.
We’ve always followed Head Start Standards, however, we didn’t have in detail
policies and procedures for each of the standards that we follow. So at the

99

moment, now, we have revised them and every so often our policies and
procedures are things that we review as things have been changing.
The director recognized that policies and procedures needed to be reviewed
regularly to ensure compliance. Table 4.4 summarizes the transformation from lowperforming to program compliance in the Human Resources area.
Table 4.4
Human Resources Before and After
Prior to Turnaround

Turnaround Evidence

Staff lacked qualifications

Changed hiring practices to ensure all staff
met requirements
Job descriptions were updated to reflect
HSPS
Directors provided clarity to staff about
roles and expectations
Programs reorganized or hired “right” staff

Job descriptions failed to reflect HSPS
Staff unclear of roles
Current organizational structure did not
reflect HSPS
Policies and procedures did not reflect
changes in HSPS

Updated policies and procedures to reflect
changes in HSPS

Ongoing monitoring systems. Turnaround leaders demonstrated important
lessons for ongoing monitoring. The respondents recognized that effective monitoring of
performance is essential to the successful improvement of their program. Thorough
analysis of data revealed there are multiple dimensions of monitoring. Directors actively
monitored multiple areas of the program for compliance. Directors monitored for: (a)
staff performance and compliance, (b) data for accuracy and follow-up, (c) timely
reporting, (d) fiscal performance, (e) governance policies, (f) program effectiveness, (g)
service delivery, and (h) Head Start changes. All of the turnaround leaders described the
importance of implementing checks to ensure staff were performing and meeting
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expectations, moreover directors monitored staff performance to ensure that procedures
were followed without creativity. Program E illustrated:
We started doing more ongoing, doing weekly monitoring, bi-weekly monitoring,
quarterly monitoring, annually monitoring, and we have reminders. So with that
monitoring in place, the milestones in place, it really supported us and improved
our program for this.
Respondents monitored data for accuracy and to ensure staff follow-up on goals.
Checks and reminders were developed to ensure reports were completed on time.
Moreover, directors monitored to ensure financial reports were accurate and made
available to the Policy Committee and board members.
The directors monitored to ensure that Policy Council and board Members were
trained and actively part of the decision making process. Additionally, directors evaluated
program performances on a regular basis and ensured service delivery met the
expectations outlined in the HSPS.
I think we’ve evolved a lot in the last year so I think that’s one of the most
important things to be successful. Implementing a checks and balance system,
making sure that you’re meeting your HR piece, ERSEA, your educational piece,
your health and safety piece, your parent engagement piece, making sure that staff
members that are coming in have the background screenings and physicals, and
making sure of the minor details. The minor details can put out of compliance.
Program E identified the importance of monitoring and ensuring the plan included
a system for monitoring minor details. The director warned that missing the minor details
can lead to noncompliance. Turnaround leaders consistently monitored for updates and
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changes that affected the program and delivery of services. The directors stayed
connected to association meetings, checked the ECKLC website and stayed connected to
other programs to monitor in order to remain aware of new developments that could
affect their programs compliance status. The director at Program C explained:
Focus on going to the Head Start specific training. That’s where they [directors]
need to be, Head Start specific training, actually go to the training, actually to it,
and listen to what’s going on and what’s being said. So Head Start training!
That’s where you get the information and of course you know you get the e-mails
and alerts and you go on, if you have questions you can go on that ECKLC
website, you got to like live it and breathe it.
The director described the importance of external monitoring to understand new
developments within in Head Start. She described the importance of maintaining an
awareness regarding changes within Head Start. The directors focused monitoring efforts
in multiple areas. The monitoring improvements are summarized in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5
Monitoring Systems Before and After
Prior to Turnaround

Evidence of Turnaround

Several participants reported that they did
not have a clear understanding of ongoing
monitor
Failed to thoroughly analyze data and
follow-up on pertinent program
information
Five of six directors attributed lack of
ongoing monitoring as reasons for
noncompliance
Participants programs plagued with late
reporting

Turnaround leaders demonstrated and
understanding of the complexity of
ongoing monitoring
Developed checks to analyze data and
monitored to ensure follow-up

Failed record keeping
Program information not documented,
inaccurate, or not submitted on time
Integrity of data questioned
Staff lacked understanding of how metrics
were derived
Leaders failed to evaluate the effectiveness
of program
Programs lacked follow-up on goals
Directors reported concerns with service
related data
Data analyzed annually

Developed strong ongoing monitoring
plans
Developed target dates and a system of
reminders for staff to ensure timely
reporting
Monitoring included checkpoints to ensure
reports are completed
Directors ensured program information
were accurate and timely
Directors monitored data
Directors provided staff training to ensure
staff competency to develop metrics
Directors engaged in regular evaluation for
program effectiveness
Monitoring plans included goal follow-up
Monitored data for accuracy
Improved data with quarterly analysis

The Head Start turnaround leader competencies in Managing Self and Managing
Others provided support in developing the appropriate action steps in the areas of
Finance, Shared Governance, Human Resources, and Monitoring Systems. The directors
successfully improved operations and brought their programs to a state of 100%
compliance with HSPS. The data revealed that there are commonalities in their
approaches to transforming their low-performing programs. The directors’ stories provide
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evidence that the combination of their competencies in Managing Self and Managing
Others and their specific action steps positioned them to achieve a successful Federal
Review with no findings and in full compliance with the HSPS. Figure 4.1 provides an
overview of the turnaround leader competencies.
Four-Stage Turnaround Model.
As participants addressed strategies for turnaround, a four-stage framework was
suggested, referred to here as the Four-Stage Turnaround Model. The conceptual
framework of the Four-Stage Turnaround Model is shown in Figure 4.1. Notably, the
model begins with the individual and works outwardly. This inside-out approach
illustrates the types of changes that the turnaround leader needs to consider, providing a
guide for marshaling personal capabilities, accessing available technical assistance
resources, leading others through turnaround strategies, and assessing needed change in
targeted organizational systems.
The first stage, Preparing Self, builds the leader’s personal capacity for change.
The second stage, Accessing Resources, provides technical assistance resources to help
guide the change effort. Next, Leading Others is the stage in which the leader utilizes
competencies gained in the previous stages to direct the change efforts of staff and
stakeholders. Finally, Turnaround Systems the last stage includes actions steps and
accountability systems to ensure change in the specific targeted areas. The first three
stages of the model underlie the effectiveness of the final stage, Turnaround Systems.
Preparing Self. Preparing Self is the initial stage as illustrated in Figure 4.1. At
this stage the participants developed self-efficacy skills and generative capabilities to
guide the turnaround strategy. Moreover, the directors engaged in self-reflection and
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developed the inner strength for change. Preparing Self activities varied among
participants. However, all participants engaged in one or more of the following: (a) selfreflection to assess their personal readiness to guide the improvement strategy, (b)
gaining personal confidence and support from superiors, (c) working with a personal
coach, and (d) staying connected to developments within the field.
Self-reflection to assess readiness to guide the improvement strategy. During this
stage turnaround leaders assess their personal readiness to facilitate the change effort.
The former director at Program D engaged in a process of assessing personal readiness
for change.
A lot of departments had to make budget cuts and for the director at that time it
was very stressful and she decided that, she had been in Head Start for a long time
as well, and she decided that for her family and for herself that leaving the
program was what was in her best interest because of the high stress that was
going on at that time. I think it was just too much for her.
The director at Program D recounted the Preparing Self process of the former
director. Conversely, Preparing Self does not always assume that the leader moves
forward with the change process. The turnaround leader makes critical decisions about
facilitating the change process. As illustrated in the participant’s narration, the turnaround
leader may find that the organizational and personal goals are not congruent and may
choose an alternative path and therefore decide not to lead the turnaround effort.
However, once the participant decides to move forward with leading the turnaround
strategy, the individual must gain personal confidence and will benefit from support from
the organization’s leadership staff.
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Gaining confidence and support from superiors. Gaining support from superiors
is illustrated by participants as vital to their turnaround success. The participants
described the importance of gaining personal confidence in addition to support from their
superiors in preparing for the change process. Program A described the personal factors
attributed to the turnaround success during this stage and the importance of gaining
support from the CEO and leadership team in preparing for the turnaround.
Personal factors would be the experience I had and the fact that I’m pretty
fearless…I was confident that it could be done. I think institutionally there was
strong support from the president and CEO who is my direct supervisor and the
rest of the senior leadership team.
The director at Program A demonstrated self-efficacy skills in preparation to
execute the course of action necessary to turnaround the specific content areas. The
participant determined the requisite level of self-efficacy skills necessary to facilitate the
action steps to improve the Head Start program and ensure turnaround systems are
achieved. The participant described an attitude of fearlessness and the confidence to
move forward with the change. Additionally, support from supervisors and peers are
recognized by the participant as a strong support in developing the belief that the
outcome could be achieved.
Working with a personal coach. “I went through doing all these things and all of
the changes, I needed a life coach… [I was] determined and committed, but I needed to
get to know myself better.” Program E’s reflection illustrated the importance of preparing
self during the turnaround process and gaining a better understanding of self. The
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recollection of the director at Program E demonstrates the individual’s readiness to
improve self in order to facilitate the process of leading others.
Staying connected to developments within the field. Engaging in research and
staying attuned to new developments within the field are essential to the change process.
The participant from Program B described the importance of engaging in research and
staying connected to new developments.
As a management team, the leadership of this program are a lot smarter than we
were then and have taken a much more proactive approach to constantly reading,
trying to stay ahead of what requirements are and expectations…I honestly have
to say Head Start has changed so fast in the last couple years… I truly can’t
hardly even get through all the e-mails we get on a daily basis with new webinars
requested and new information requested. So there’s been a rapid change. But I
think trying to stay more engaged with local state and federal regs.
The participant illustrated the need to read and stay connected to the rapidly
changing Head Start environment. The turnaround leader described the need to gain an
understanding of what was new and developing in order to assess the resources necessary
to help facilitate the turnaround process.
Accessing Resources. Next is Accessing Resources, the second stage of the Fourstage Turnaround Model, illustrated at the center of Figure 4.1. At this stage, the directors
provided an assessment for the types of resources necessary to guide the turnaround
strategy. During this stage, the participants assessed the personal need for Formal and
Informal Technical Assistance or a combination of the two. Formal Technical Assistance
includes the support of an OHS consultant or engaging with an independent consultant.
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Formal technical assistance provides well-defined relationships either through legal
contracts or terms defined by OHS. Additionally, Formal Technical Assistance Resources
define expectations, detail outcomes and determine specific functions and expectations
for both the director and consultant. The consultants provided technical assistance to help
the directors develop the skills and capacity to lead the change. Additionally, participants
assessed the need to engage in one or more forms of Informal Assistance. Informal
Assistance materializes in either one or a combination of the following approaches: (a)
previous experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head Start
trainings, (d) attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools. Informal
Technical Assistance differs from Formal Technical Assistance in that resources are not
outlined with specific outcomes and defined relationships. Directors self-elect to engage
with Informal Technical assistance resources on as needed basis. The turnaround leader
illustrates engaging in two forms of Informal Technical Assistance: Previous experience
and OHS tools.
The director before me always had the Prism out. She always had that, we never
really used it though. I never understood what it was but I learned, well I took
what I learned from the director before me and used it and then started to build on
that…She had a lot of experience and she had a lot of years under her belt as far
as working for Head Start. So I took what I learned from her and I started
building on it, so I got the Prism and the Protocol, to me they’re the same thing…I
started breaking it down and getting managers together and giving them each the
area where they were covering.
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The director at Program E recollected accessing multiple Informal Technical
Assistance Resources, the director drew upon previous experience and utilized OHS tools
to support the turnaround. The director demonstrated the intersection of previous
experiences and OHS tools in providing the skills to lead others in guiding the systems
turnaround. The director also provided a checklist to the supervisors to measure the
programs compliance with the standards. The participants engaged in a process of
preparing self and assessed the need for technical assistance resources to provide specific
turnaround strategy supports. The participants utilized the skills gained to lead others.
Leading Others. The third stage, Leading Others, is illustrated in the outer circle
of Figure 4.1. At this stage, the participants engaged staff in reculturing, improved
communication, executed ongoing monitoring systems and provided professional
development for staff, parents and board members. After the directors gained the
appropriate resources to provide technical assistance, the turnaround directors
demonstrated confidence to pursue and achieve turnaround goals. The respondents
developed a clear vision and communicated expectations with staff as they led their lowperforming program into full compliance with HSPS. During this stage, the directors
employed their turnaround competences to facilitate their subordinates and constituents
into transforming their own self-interest into concern for shared goals. The directors
shared power, information, enhanced staff skills through professional development, and
helped staff to develop shared goals. Turnaround directors invested in staff training to
ensure staff were competent in meeting program outcomes. Through training and support
the turnaround leaders redefine employees work and attitudes. The turnaround leaders
focused their efforts on reculturing by building relationships with staff in effort to shift
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the culture from this is how we have always done it to a culture of accountability and
staff compliance. The turnaround directors engage staff in regular communication which
include staff meetings to ensure staff were aware of new developments. The directors
supported staff work through professional development and continuous communication.
Additionally, monitoring is essential during this stage. The directors developed a process
to ensure effective implementation of monitoring tools which are beneficial when all staff
are familiar with the tools and are aware of expectations. Turnaround directors developed
timelines to monitor program goals and support staff in assuring that timelines were met.
The program director at Program D details the actions steps necessary to facilitate staff in
gaining the knowledge and demonstrating high quality performance.
Our monitoring it goes hand and hand with our communication and the training of
the staff…We started doing more ongoing, doing weekly monitoring, bi-weekly
monitoring, quarterly monitoring, annually monitoring, ..and we have reminders.
So with that monitoring in place the milestones in place it really supported us and
improved our program. We had a lot of professional development around the
reflective practices and reflective supervision so I think that having that one-onone [meetings} with staff, individual staff, lots of the things come up there so
when the quarterly or monthly or weekly monitoring happens I mean we already
have an indication of where we need to go or what’s going on.
The director affirmed that establishing regular monitoring, communication and
providing professional development reinforce staff in following policies as prescribed.
Moreover, monitoring plans ensure that staff do not follow policies with creativity.
Executing strong monitoring plans provide Head Start directors greater opportunities for
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staff accountability and compliance with HSPS. Each monitoring plan for the
respondent’s differs in detail but is common in its goal to ensure compliance with HSPS
and accuracy of data.
Turnaround Systems. The Head Start participants provided important lessons on
how to lead others during the previous three stages of the Four-stage Turnaround Model.
However, the final stage, Turnaround Systems, illustrated in Figure 4.1 demonstrates how
the directors utilized the skills gained in the previous stages to inform the targeted
turnaround areas. The leaders applied the competencies gained in the former stages,
Preparing Self, Accessing Resources, and Leading Others and through its application
focused the turnaround strategy in four specific areas that demonstrated dramatic
performance decline. The four outer legs depicted in Figure 4.1 represent the systems
targeted for improvement and its connection to the Preparing Self, Accessing Resources,
and Leading Others stages. In the current study, the participants focused turnaround
efforts in human resources, finance, shared governance, and ongoing monitoring. The
model provides flexibility in that the outer legs can be increased or decreased depending
on the systems targeted for improvement. The unlabeled boxes depicted in Figure 4.1
illustrate the flexibility in the Turnaround Systems stage of the model. For example, if a
director has determined that non-compliance concerns are only in the shared governance
area, one outer leg would be depicted in the model. Moreover, if the director determined
change necessary in the fiscal and shared governance areas there would be two outer legs
depicted and so on. However, the researcher contends that the Preparing Self, Accessing
Resources, and Leading Others Stages are critical and do not provide the same flexibility
as the outer legs. In sum, the Preparing Self and Accessing Resources stages supported
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the participants in developing capabilities and strategy. In the Leading Others stage, the
participants influenced staff change and performance to operate in alignments with the
HSPS within the designated systems.

Finance
Stage 4
Turnaround Systems
Monitoring Plans

Stage 3
Leading Others

Reculturing

Independent
Consultant

Stage 1
Preparing Self

Previous
Experience

Inner Strength

Other HS
Directors

Personal Change
OHS Consultant

Self-awareness

HS Training

Shared Governance

Informal TA
Resources

Formal TA
Resources

Communication

Human Resources

Stage 2
Accessing Resources

HS Association
OHS Tools

Professional Development

Monitoring
Systems

Figure 4.1. Four-Stage Turnaround model.
Chapter 5 presents the implications of the findings. The researcher analyzes the
directors’ actions steps and its applicability to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model.
Additionally, the chapter provides discourse relative to the implications of the study for

112

OHS and Head Start directors, provides a review of the methodological limitations to the
study, and recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Chapter 4 presented findings regarding the steps turnaround leaders identified as
critical to the success of their improvement strategy. The directors identified their
processes towards program improvement. Interestingly, the participants shared
commonalities in their actions steps. Each of the six turnaround leaders interviewed
achieved a successful review with no findings after implementing their improvement
strategy.
The findings from this study contribute to the field as pioneering research
regarding turnaround practices in Head Start. This study addressed the gap in research
relative to Head Start turnaround practices. There is an absence of research that
investigates the turnaround practices implemented by Head Start turnaround directors.
Subsequently, the researcher substituted K-12 turnaround literature to gain a scholarly
perspective on turnaround principals. The researcher found that school turnaround
literature provides a better fit to explore turnaround within Head Start programs than
other turnaround literature.
Chapter 5 presents the implications of the findings. First, the researcher analyzes
the participants’ actions steps and its applicability to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change
model in addition to providing a comparison of the findings to the turnaround literature
examined in Chapter 2. Next, the chapter examines implications of the study for OHS and
Head Start directors. Then, a review of the methodological limitations to the study are
examined and finally a review of the recommendations for future research.
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Implications of Findings
Kotter’s model. Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model is developed as a
guide to the business for-profit sector, but Kotter contends that the theory is applicable to
any organizational change. Kotter (1996) avers that his eight-stage process is necessary
to lead successful and sustained change within any organization. Moreover, Kotter argues
that the change model is sequential and employs the following steps:
1. Establishing a sense of urgency
2. Creating the guiding coalition
3. Developing a vision and strategy
4. Communicating the change vision
5. Empowering broad based action
6. Generating short-term wins
7. Consolidating gains and producing more change
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture
Kotter (1996) delineates that following this sequential multi-stage process is
important to leading successful change. This section provides an analysis of the study
participants’ action steps during the respective turnarounds to investigate if they
employed any of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. Additionally, the researcher
will explore if the steps were applied in the requisite order. According to Kotter (1996),
change cannot be accelerated by skipping steps in the change sequence. Kotter (1996)
asserts that critical mistakes within stages can stifle organizational transformation.
Establish a sense of urgency. Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model begins
with establishing a Sense of Urgency. Kotter (1996) proffers that change leaders must
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eliminate status quo and create a sense of urgency by informing all staff that the change is
necessary. Kotter (1996) delineates that change leaders make staff modifications, require
all staff to change and mandate for quick and dramatic improvement. The study findings
imply that the Head Start directors’ actions are in alignment with the first step in Kotter’s
(1996) model. The director at Program A illustrated how a sense of urgency was
established:
The CEO basically stepped in and sort of hands on came down here and took sort
of a hands on approach and changed a lot, got rid of some staff and so I think
that’s where I see the beginning of the change process happening and honestly if
the CEO hadn’t done that before I came in I don’t think I would have been
successful.
The CEO’s hands on approach, in addition to, making staff changes demonstrated
a sense of urgency. The participants made staff changes when necessary to indicate that
change was critical. The directors also communicated the necessity of change among
staff through meetings and by updating policies and procedures. Findings were in
agreement that the participants established a sense of urgency by making immediate
changes within themselves and sought technical assistance to develop the skills necessary
to create change.
Turnaround literature describes creating a sense of urgency by changing
leadership. Frederick and Gift (2009) delineate that guiding the turnaround effort with
new leadership is beneficial. The study findings reveal that five of the six turnaround
programs changed leaders. Five participants were hired to make improvements within the
program. Interestingly, all of the participants successfully improved their respective
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programs. These findings imply that a leadership change may illustrate a sense of
urgency, but does not indicate the success or failure of the strategy. All of the directors
engaged in the Managing Self process through self-preparation and technical assistance.
Study findings imply that regardless of the change in leadership, the turnaround leader
must engage in a process of preparing self to organize and develop the inner strength to
facilitate the change process. Concomitantly, the leader must establish a process to gain
technical assistance. Based on the findings of this study, changing leadership does not
indicate a sense of urgency, or the success of the improvement process.
Create a guiding coalition. The second step in Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change
model encompasses assembling a group to lead the change to ensure that all staff commit
to the effort. All of the directors led the turnaround change and attributed their
supervisory staff as major contributors to the successful change effort. Findings were in
agreement with Kotter’s (1996) second step. All of the respondents led their change
efforts and provided guidance to their respective coalitions. Additionally, the directors
took an active role in guiding the turnaround effort by engaging in ongoing monitoring.
Not all staff committed to the change efforts, but the directors engaged in a process of
reculturing to ensure the change effort advanced. Murphy and Myers (2009) aver that it is
critical to change the culture and restore confidence by empowering the team. Study
findings are consistent with the researcher’s assertions. The directors worked with their
leadership teams to ensure they were committed to the change process. The respondents
recognized the importance of ensuring their leadership teams were committed to the
change effort.
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Kotter (1996) contends that it is important for the change leader to guide and
develop the leadership team. The study findings suggests when participants recognized a
lack of staff commitment they either managed staff out of the organization or worked
with the team by engaging them in leadership retreats to resolve issues and develop a
sense of cohesion. Furthermore, the directors developed inner strength and gained the
knowledge to lead the effort. Respondents ensured their leadership teams were committed
to communicating the vision and empowering staff to change. In the following account,
the director at Program E described the supportive efforts of the guiding coalition:
We always make group decisions and stick together, the same way that the
managers do, the site supervisors also do at their level. So I think just the culture
of working together towards one common goal is something that really changed
and using reports as a way to come together as managers and be united and
understanding what’s going on in the different components.
The director’s recollection illustrates the importance of cohesion and working
towards a common vision. The program’s leadership staff demonstrated support for the
vision within multiple levels of management. These findings reveal that developing the
coalition is critical to the turnaround leaders’ success. The respondents developed a team
committed to the vision.
Create a vision. Kotter (1996) establishes that change leaders must develop a
vision for change. Similarly, Duke (2006) suggests that turnaround leaders must create a
mission and vision. Kowal and Ableidinger’s (2011) research is in agreement that
developing a vision and focus are critical to the successful turnaround strategy. The study
findings imply that the turnaround leaders’ vision and focus were driven by the OHS
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mandate to immediately comply with all HSPS and remedy the program from its noncompliant and deficient state. Despite the impetus for the vision, the directors supported
the change vision and implemented processes to communicate the vision. The director
from Program A depicted the importance of creating a vision and communicating the
vision:
Being a leader your often times not popular and particularly through change
because people want to hold on to the way that they did things and certainly no
one wants to be told that they’re doing things wrong. So being a little thick
skinned and having a vision and remaining true to it and communicating and over
communicating, you can never communicate enough. You think people know
why and where we’re going and sometimes people don’t get that message so
putting that message out multiple times.
The director validated the importance of developing a vision for change as she
supported the vision throughout the process. Furthermore, the director recognized the
benefit of communicating the change vision regularly throughout the change process.
These actions also demonstrate alignment with Kotter’s next step.
Communicating the change vision. Kotter (1996) maintains that change leaders
must communicate the vision. Several turnaround studies provide evidence in support of
Kotter’s fourth step (Herman, 2012, Public Impact, 2008, and Public Impact, 2009). The
Head Start leaders’ action steps provide evidence in alignment with Kotter’s (1996)
assertion. The findings affirm that Head Start leaders communicated the change efforts
through staff meetings and direct communication. All of directors stated that they
understood the importance of communicating the message multiple times in various
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media formats. The Head Start turnaround leaders ensured staff were clear about the
change efforts. Additionally, staff were provided opportunities to hear the change
message multiple times throughout the improvement process in order to empower them in
understanding the vision and new direction.
Empowering others to act. Kotter (1996) argues that it is critical for change
leaders to eliminate barriers to achieve the intended change. Kotter suggests that this can
be accomplished through experiments within the strategy. Findings related to turnover
indicate that the Head Start turnaround leaders eliminated barriers through staff turnover.
Conversely, participants also provided support to staff to remove barriers in meeting the
required education requirements. Program C described how the Head Start program
provided staff tuition reimbursement to remove financial barriers to ensure staff meet the
education requirements for teachers.
We supported the staff. Staff that needed to go to school or get a CDA, we have a
tuition reimbursement program, so we made sure that they took advantage of that
so they could fulfill what they needed to do.
The director’s recollection demonstrates that removing barriers to change also
empowered staff to support the vision. As documented in the findings, participants
clarified roles by updating job descriptions and reorganized to ensure operational
efficiencies. Additionally, participants provided cross-content training. The findings
imply that Head Start turnaround leaders engaged in actions steps to eliminate barriers to
change.
Generating short term wins. Kotter (1996) posits that short term wins offer
change leaders evidence that their strategy is on track. Consequently, the leader is
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empowered to push towards the goal. Kotter (1996) argues that short term wins
encourage others to support the goal. The findings show that respondents realized
personal short term wins when they monitored the program and found that policies were
being adhered to by staff. Conversely, none of the directors indicated a process for
generating short term wins with staff. Opportunities to reward and celebrate small wins
are not described by the turnaround directors. Notably, one of the six directors detailed
the importance of providing staff assurances of their progress during the change process,
but the findings do not support Kotter’s (1996) assertion. Inquiry should be made into
directors implementation of short term wins in a future study. Kotter (1996) contends
that short term wins are critical to the change process, but the study evidence maintains
that generating short term wins are not critical during the turnaround of Head Start
programs. It appears that the directors’ development of inner strength during the
Managing Self process motivated directors to achieve the goal. Moreover, the directors
continually communicated the necessity for the change effort and engaged staff in a
process of reculturing in an attempt to change behaviors and motivate staff to improve.
Consolidate improvements and produce more change. Kotter (1996) establishes
that change leaders need to consistently motivate individuals to continue momentum and
drive change. Program B described the process in ensuring that victories were not
claimed prematurely:
I think that became a whole culture shift…never feeling like we arrived.
Constantly going, okay this is good, but now we need to raise the bar and that’s
the old [adage] when you meet the bar you raise the bar. And we had that hanging
all over everybody’s office-when you meet the bar you raise the bar.
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The director extended staff thinking beyond the incremental evidence of
improvement and extended it towards the greater vision. Kotter contends that the
turnaround leader must be careful not to claim victory to soon and continue improvement
efforts until the goal is actualized. The study findings are consistent with Kotter’s (1996)
assertions. All of the turnaround leaders detail the importance of continuous
improvement. Findings reveal that participants continually monitored staff for
compliance with policies and HSPS. Moreover, the directors attributed ongoing
monitoring systems as critical to ensuring compliance and a process for continuous
improvements to sustain the change.
Institutionalize new approaches. Kotter (1996) claims that in this final stage,
successful change is evidenced by staff illustrating the embodiment of the shared norms
and new behaviors. Study findings are consistent with Kotter’s (1996) claim. One of the
study programs contends that it has sustained the change as evidenced by a second
concurrent Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. The director at Program E
maintained that staff have successfully adopted the change.
I think they’ve adopted it now. It didn’t happen overnight. I think it’s an ongoing
improvement as well, but I think it’s working well. It did take a few years; I
would say maybe two years to get into the swing of that. But now it’s just
happening, I mean yes there’s always ways to improve, sometimes meetings are
too long, or they ask for management support, but I think overall they’ve adapted.
The director confirmed that the adoption of change required a few years to
institutionalize, but concedes that the behavior change have been embodied by staff. All
the directors indicated that they were successful at achieving behavior changes among
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staff, but agree that the process for change is continuous. The turnaround leaders agreed
that strong monitoring efforts are critical to ensure that policies and procedures are
adhered to and staff commit to the new behaviors.
Kotter (1996) argues that his change model must be followed in sequence. The
Head Start directors did not provide evidence that they followed the steps in order.
Moreover, the findings indicate that the order and the number of steps the change leaders
engaged in are insignificant. This finding is in contrast with his assertion that change
cannot be accelerated if steps are skipped and that success is achieved by following the
steps sequentially. Study findings support seven of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change
model. Additional findings reveal that not all of the steps in his change model are critical
for the successful turnaround. Furthermore, steps can be skipped without detriment to the
strategy.
Limitations of Kotter’s change model. The study provides an analysis of Kotter’s
eight-stage change model. The findings support much of Kotter’s change model.
However, the results imply that Kotter’s model has limitations. Kotter’s asserts that for
the successful change to occur all of the steps must be engaged in and acted upon in the
required order. Whereas the study participants did not engage in all of Kotter’s eight
stages and did not adopt the requisite order. Conversely, they all achieved successful
change.
Additionally, the study does not provide evidence that that the participants
engaged in Kotter’s stage 6 Generating Short term Wins. The respondents did not
communicate ways in which they rewarded staff for short term wins. However, the
respondents did indicate that there were instances that provided evidence of high-
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performance behaviors indicating the turnaround process was effective. The study
suggests that the timeframe of the turnaround did not allow the directors to make time for
celebrating successes with staff during the change process. The participants described the
importance of meeting HSPS and implementing change quickly to ensure highperformance and a successful Federal Monitoring Review.
Interestingly, Kotter’s model fails to provide change steps for the turnaround
leaders in preparing for the improvement strategy. The model describes steps to guide the
strategy; however, action steps necessary for preparing self in facilitating the turnaround
strategy are not described. However, the Four-Stage Turnaround Model outlines the
importance of the change leader developing inner strength, self-awareness and personal
skills necessary to prepare to set the turnaround strategy. The study findings indicate the
importance of building strength, reflective skills, and generative capacities within the
turnaround leaders to prepare to guide staff and stakeholders through the change process.
The study reveals that the Preparing Self stage is critical to the turnaround success.
Conversely, Kotter’s model fails to detail stages of the leader’s self-preparation as the
change leader.
Additionally, the study implies that Kotter’s model does not warrant a requisite
order. The findings reveal that the participants did not follow Kotter’s steps in sequential
order and despite this fact each participant demonstrated success. The research findings
imply that Kotter’s prescriptive approach is not necessary. The Head Start turnaround
leaders achieved success and engaged in seven of Kotter’s eight stages. However, some
adaptations were made. More specifically, the participants replaced the rigidity of the
model and modified it by engaging with stages that best fit the culture of their specific

124

Head Start program. Notably, the findings imply that the seven stages of Kotter’s (1996)
model correlate with the Four-Stage Turnaround Model, as shown in Figure 4.1. The two
models seem to operate in congruence. However, the Four-Stage Turnaround Model
includes provisions for the turnaround leader to develop the capacities to guide the
turnaround strategy; Kotter’s model fails to do so. Kotter’s model provides prescriptive
stages for organizational culture. However, the study findings imply that the Four-Stage
Turnaround model (see Figure 4.1) is more applicable for the culture Head Start
programs. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the steps that each respondent engaged in.
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Table 5.1
Participants’ Activity Levels with Kotter’s (1996) Eight-Stage Change Model.
Head
Start
Leader

Step 1
Establish a
sense of
urgency

Step 2
Create a
guiding
coalition

Step 3
Create a
vision

Step 4
Step 5
Communicate Empower
the change
others to act
vision

Step 6
Generating
short term
wins

Step 7
Consolidate
improvements
and produce
more change
X

Step 8
Institutionalize
new approaches

A

X

X

X

X

X

B

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

C

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

D

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

E

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

F

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Turnaround literature. As noted previously, School turnaround literature is
examined in Chapter 2 as it most closely resembles Head Start Programs. The researcher
conducted an exhaustive review for Head Start turnaround literature and yielded no
findings. The turnaround literature examined illustrates the strategies of principals in K12 educational settings. This section will provide evidence of the applicability of the
theories relative to the actions steps for successful change. The literature is organized into
three sections: (a) Setting the stage, (b) Head Start Turnaround Leaders as Change
Agents, and (c) Head Start Turnaround Leader Competencies.
Setting the stage. Several turnaround articles assert that changing the leader is
critical to the turnaround success (Murphy, 2008, Rhim, Kowal, Hassel & Hassel, 2007).
Duke (2006) provides a contrasting argument that changing the leader is not critical to the
successful turnaround. The findings in this study are consistent with the research that
supports the change in leadership. All of the Head Start directors achieved a successful
review with no findings and were cited by OHS as operating in full compliance with
HSPS. Five of the six programs experienced a change in leadership. Findings maintain
that all of the Head Start turnaround leaders experienced a success regardless of decisions
to change or maintain the current leadership.
Communication with stakeholders is critical to the successful turnaround.
Robinson and Buntrock (2011) and Public Impact (2009) research supports this assertion.
In agreement with the research assumptions, the findings reveal that the turnaround
participants identified the importance of including stakeholders during the improvement
process. The leaders engaged parents and board members throughout the process.
Turnaround literature asserts that engaging stakeholders can positively support the effort
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and minimize opportunities for pessimists to deter positive efforts. The Head Start
turnaround leaders actions steps provide evidence that they engaged stakeholders through
professional development and ensured they were provided clarity regarding roles.
Head Start turnaround leaders as change agents. Themes in this study
corroborate with the findings of previous research studies which contend that turnaround
leaders lead the change, reculture, develop a vision, understand reasons for decline, and
possess unique competencies.
The turnaround leaders are critical to the change effort. Several researchers
provide evidence regarding the significance of the turnaround leader’s role (Duke, 2006;
Duke & Jacobson, 2011; Duke & Salmonowicz, 2011; Murphy & Meyers, 2009; Tucker
et al., 2008). Tucker et al. (2008) contend that principals trained as turnaround leaders
demonstrate greater success than principals that were not formally trained. Based on the
findings in this study, all of the Head Start turnaround leaders engaged in either formal or
informal technical assistance to prepare for the improvement effort. Interestingly, one of
the participants indicated she received specialized training prior to her current turnaround
role. Despite this fact, findings reveal that the Head Start directors did not demonstrate
variations in success which can be attributed to turnaround training. All of the directors
engaged in formal or informal technical assistance or a combination of the two. All of the
turnaround leaders achieved a successful Federal Monitoring Review. The study findings
imply that engaging in technical assistance is critical to the successful review.
Reculturing is essential to the successful turnaround effort. Murphy and Meyer
(2008) detail the importance of reculturing. Likewise, Fullan (2007) supports the claim
that turnaround leaders must employ influencing and motivational skills with staff in
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order to change culture and shift employee behaviors. All of the Head Start turnaround
directors engaged their programs in some form of reculturing. Findings reveal that the
respondents recultured by communicating the vision and gaining staff support.
Additionally, participants developed a culture of accountability among all staff. Duke’s
(2006) study demonstrates that turnaround principals removed staff that failed to
illustrate the capacity to improve performance by counseling them out or motivated staff
to retire. Study findings support Duke’s (2006) research. The Head Start turnaround
directors established comparable practices with resistant staff.
Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) assert that principals need to understand the
reasons for failure and pose critical questions about the reasons for low-performance and
focus efforts on developing improvements and understanding when to eliminate
unsuccessful strategy efforts. The researchers contend that turnaround leaders need
support in decision making. Moreover, they proffer that turnaround leaders need specific
training. The findings of this study demonstrate support with this research. All of the
Head Start turnaround leaders provided that they had a clear understanding for the
reasons for their programs performance decline prior to the start. The respondents used
that knowledge in addition to technical assistance to develop an improvement strategy.
All of the directors detailed the importance of technical assistance and support with
individual questions as requisite to the success of their strategy.
Tucker et al. (2008) espouse that turnaround leaders develop a vision to improve
the organization, commit to excellence, and develop methods for continuous and ongoing
improvement. The findings from this study support the research of Tucker et al. (2008).
All of the Head Start turnaround leaders developed a vision, committed to excellence,
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and developed strategies for ongoing improvement. The participants monitored their
programs for compliance and engaged in informal and formal technical assistance.
Head Start turnaround leader competencies. Turnaround literature asserts that
there are unique competencies of turnaround leaders that are not typical to leaders leading
high performing programs (Public Impact, 2008). Public Impact (2008) delineates that
there are specific competencies exclusive to turnaround leaders. This present study does
not contrast the competencies of Head Start Directors in high-performing programs to
low-performing programs in need of turnaround. Present study findings show that Head
Start turnaround leaders illustrate similar competencies. The research developed by
Public Impact (2008) indicates that turnaround leader competencies represent “patterns of
actions” (p. 4). The researchers assert that there are four unique competencies of
turnaround leaders and clustered leader action steps in the following areas: (a) driving for
results, (b) influencing for results, (c) problem-solving, and (d) showing confidence to
lead.
Driving for results. Public Impact (2008) posits that turnaround leaders develop a
clear plan for change. Study findings are consistent with this assumption. The Head Start
directors planned for changing during the Managing Self stage. The directors developed
inner strength and gained skills as they received technical assistance.
Influencing for results. The researchers assert that turnaround leaders develop a
coalition to support and influence others. The findings affirm this assertion. The Head
Start turnaround leaders’ increased morale with staff by engaging in retreats and worked
with staff to resolve issues and develop team cohesion. Additionally, through the process
of reculturing, the directors communicated a clear vision and provided staff with
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professional development. The Head Start directors’ actions support the researchers’
assertion. The findings imply that participants demonstrated critical turnaround
competencies operating during the Leading Others stage.
Problem solving. The researchers contend that turnaround competencies include
skills in problem solving. Findings are in support of the researchers claim. The
turnaround leaders interviewed demonstrated competencies in resolving conflict. The
participants faced conflict when staff illustrated resistance to the vision and change
process. The Head Start turnaround leaders made critical decisions related to staff and
organizational operations. The participants demonstrated competencies in this area as
they successfully resolved problems.
Showing confidence to lead. Public Impact (2008) posits that turnaround leaders
demonstrate the confidence to lead. Findings were in agreement with the researchers’
position. Head Start turnaround leaders demonstrated confidence in leading the change
effort after they engaged in the Managing Self stage. Directors established the knowledge
to lead the change and confidently communicated the vision for change to staff, parents,
and board members.
In congruence with the current research, the study findings also reveal that Head
Start turnaround leaders espoused the importance of accurate data to monitor their
respective programs. Kowal and Hassel (2011) found that turnaround leaders are driven
by data. Moreover, the researchers assert the following: (a) turnaround leaders develop
goals after critical analysis, (b) motivate and communicates success to all stakeholders,
(c) develop a vision and strategy aligned with activities to ensure the goal, (d) improve
communication by sharing the vision and goals with staff and leaders, and (e) empower
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others to act by removing barriers to achieve the change. Kowal and Hassel’s (2011)
research illustrate similarities to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. The findings
reveal that Head Start turnaround leaders demonstrate actions that support the work of
Kowal and Hassel (2011). Head Start turnaround leaders developed goals for change after
they understood the reasons for decline. Table 5.2 summarizes the findings that support
and contrast turnaround literature.
The respondents engaged stakeholders in problem solving, training, and updated
them on programmatic improvements. Additionally, the participants communicated the
vision and strategy and ensured that goals were achieved through ongoing monitoring
systems. The Head Start turnaround directors focused on improving communications and
goal sharing through reculturing efforts. Furthermore, they removed barriers to achieve
the vision by managing out staff that did not support the vision. Whereas, remaining staff
were trained and provided clarity about changes to their work. The findings of the
research appear to support much of the school turnaround literature.

132

Table 5.2
Comparison of Turnaround Leader Findings
School Turnaround leaders
Changing the leader is critical to turnaround.
(Murphy, 2008; Rhim, Kowal, Hassel & Hassel,
2007)
Communication with stakeholders is critical to
the successful turnaround. (Buntrock, 2011;
Public Impact, 2009)
Formally trained turnaround leaders experience
greater turnaround success (Tucker et al., 2008).
Reculturing is essential to the successful
turnaround. (Murphy &Meyer, 2008; Fullan,
2007;Duke, 2006).
Turnaround leaders need to understand the
reasons for failure (Duke & Salmonowicz ,2010)
Turnaround leaders need specific training and
support with decision making (Duke, 2006).
Turnaround leaders develop a vision, commit to
excellence and engage in ongoing improvement
efforts (Tucker et al.,2008).
Turnaround leaders have unique competencies
(Public Impact, 2008)
Turnaround leaders are driven by data (Kowal &
Hassel, 2008).
School Turnaround leaders developed goals for
change.
School turnaround leaders motivate and
communicate successes with stakeholders.
School turnaround leaders develop a vision and
align actions steps with strategy.
School turnaround leaders improved
communication by sharing vision and goals with
staff and leaders
School turnaround leaders removed barriers to
ensure change was achieved.

Head Start Turnaround leaders
Findings are in support. Changing the leader is
critical to turnaround success.
Findings are in support. Turnaround leaders
supported parents and board members throughout
the improvement process.
Findings are in contrast. The findings indicate that
Head Start turnaround leaders both formally and
informally trained shared turnaround success.
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround
leaders engage their staff in some form of
reculturing.
Findings are in support. Turnaround leaders
demonstrated a clear understanding of the reasons
for their programs decline.
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround
leaders engaged specific training in the Managing
Self phase.
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround
leaders committed to the vision, guided the
program towards excellence and implemented
monitoring systems to ensure compliance and
ongoing improvement.
Findings are in support. The turnaround leaders
illustrate unique competencies.
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround
leaders espoused the importance of ensuring the
accuracy of data to monitor program efficiency.
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders
developed goals for change
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders
motivated and communicated success with
stakeholders
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders
developed a vision and aligned action steps with
strategy
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround
leaders improved communication by sharing
vision and goals with staff and leaders.
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders
remove barriers to ensure change
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Limitations
This study has several limitations. The study data was derived primarily from the
recollections of the six participants and relied on self-reported data. Additionally, there
were 41 Head Start Grantees that met the study criteria and six participants agreed to
participate. The small participant pool makes it difficult to generalize across the Head
Start field. A study encompassing a larger group of participants may yield divergent or
additional findings. Additionally, the lack of demographic data of the participants may be
a limitation. The researcher purposely concealed the demographic data of the participants
to ensure the confidentiality of each participant. However, the study did not seek to
explore or contrast demographic data. It sought to investigate turnaround practices and
understand the specific action steps implemented by Head Start turnaround leaders who
successfully improved their low-performing programs to a high-performing program.
Findings from this study may not be relevant in non-Head Start settings.
Uniquely, Head Start programs are subjected to the HSPS, therefore OHS Federal
Monitoring Reviews and HSPS compliance are not applicable in non-Head Start settings.
However, this could be remedied through an investigation of the systems and regulatory
requirements for non-Head Start settings.

The study participants expressed concerns

about providing vulnerable program information in fear of the perceived possibility of
repercussions with OHS. The participants were cautious of the data they revealed.
Respondents expressed considerable concerns about the researcher providing
geographical and identifying information that could be detected through deductive
measures to reveal the program’s identity. This fear may have prevented directors from
sharing other critical data that may have added to the study findings.
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Recommendations
As a result of the lessons learned, study participants offer valuable insights as to
the specific issues that affect low-performing programs during the turnaround of a Head
Start program. The lessons the participants provide offer detail regarding the turnaround
leadership competencies and the actions steps necessary to turnaround troubled Head
Start programs. From the present study, six recommendations emerge. The researcher
proposes three recommendations for OHS: (a) anonymously survey Head Start directors
to understand their perspectives for causes for chronic noncompliance, (b) establish a
sense of trust between OHS consultants and Head Start Grantees, and (c) develop
measures to validate and formalize informal learning communities among Head Start
directors. Additionally, the researcher proposes three recommendations for Head Start
directors: (a) employ the use of the Four-Stage Turnaround model as a road map for
turnaround success, (b) develop a system to formalize informal learning communities
between directors, and (c) establish mentoring systems between Head Start directors.
Implications for OHS. Turnaround literature contends that external forces are the
impetus for school turnaround (Murphy, 2008; Public Impact, 2007; Rhim, Kowal,
Hassel & Hassel, 2007). Turnaround mandates begin at the federal level, and mandates
are communicated down from the state and local level to the district. The same holds true
for Head Start programs. Congress approves and develops the changes to the HSPS. The
HSPS are approved and OHS monitors programs to ensure that Head Start programs are
operating in compliance. Murphy (2008) asserts that districts should evaluate the reasons
for performance decline and take quick actions to gauge the problem and develop a plan
for operational efficiencies.
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OHS’ Reports to Congress (2008 and 2009) identify that there is a serious
problem with chronic non-compliance among Head Start Grantees. There is a paucity of
evidence that indicates that OHS has provided a comprehensive evaluation among Head
Start Grantees to investigate the causes of decline. The researcher asserts that this is a
critical opportunity for OHS to improve Head Start services. As the study findings reveal,
all of the participants attributed their lack of understanding to the changes made to the
HSPS as a contributing factor to their programs non-compliant and deficient status,
additionally the respondents’ detailed their concerns with the ambiguity of the HSPS.
OHS must investigate opportunities to understand participant concerns and develop
multiple opportunities to clarify to Grantees about the continuous changes in operating
under the HSPS. The researcher proposes that OHS anonymously survey Head Start
programs to understand the reasons for chronic non-compliance. Moreover, from the
survey data develop trainings and communications that provide clarity regarding full
compliance and best practices.
Interestingly, the participants gained a better understanding of HSPS expectations
after they engaged in self-development and technical assistance. Study findings reveal
that participants expressed concerns in sharing information with OHS consultants. The
researcher concedes that OHS provides supports for directors but contends that OHS
should explore opportunities to improve the consultative process and investigate
relationships between OHS consultants and Grantees. Study findings reveal that trust is a
major concern. As evidenced in the participants concerns with the researcher protecting
the identities of the respondents. It is recommended that OHS work to establishing a
sense of trust between Head Start directors and OHS consultants in an effort to improve
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the effectiveness of technical assistance, by separating the role of the OHS consultant and
technical assistance. OHS should define and separate roles for OHS consultants and OHS
technical assistance staff. Whereby, OHS technical assistance staff provides grantees
support without punitive measures for noncompliance and establishing trust.
Subsequently, this act would create positive communication and feedback between OHS
staff and the grantees in an effort to increase performance and effectiveness within
programs.
Additional findings reveal that participants sought programmatic supports through
informal methods. Participants engaged other Head Start directors to gain better
understanding of common non-compliances and program practices. These actions should
signal to OHS that there is a unique community of collaboration among Head Start
directors. OHS should recognize the utility of collaboration among programs and
empower Grantees to support one another. Interestingly, the unintended effects of
recompetition, may ultimately damage the collaborative nature between Head Start
directors. Study findings reveal that some directors may become hesitant to share trade
secrets since recompetetion has developed a pathway for programs to compete for Head
Start grants.
The researcher asserts that OHS should capitalize on the utility of collaboration
and develop measures to validate this informal method of technical support. Furthermore,
developing a formal system of technical support between directors in good standing and
struggling non-compliant Head Start programs will increase opportunities for programs to
come into full compliance with HSPS. Findings reveal that participants trusted other
Head Start directors operating programs in good standing. It is recommended that OHS
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explore developing mentoring programs between the programs and establish systems of
support without consequences. As allies, Grantees can support one another and ultimately
reduce the number of non-compliant programs in lieu of the current system of
recompetition.
The researcher delineates that OHS may need to develop publications and
webinars to reinforce competencies among Grantees in meeting HSPS, more specifically
in ongoing monitoring and information sharing of common non-compliances. Study data
provided evidence that participants were not clear on the complexity of ongoing
monitoring. The researcher proffers that these recommendation are essential for OHS to
explore in an effort to transform Head Start programs and create systems for Head Start
directors to improve programs for Head Start children.
Implications for Head Start directors. In the absence of Head Start turnaround
literature, this research study has critical implications for Head Start directors. Head Start
directors are confronted with the critical need to ensure their programs are providing
children a high-quality program. The implications are derived from the data from the
Head Start participants. The participants’ retrospective feedback offers pertinent insights
in support of directors wanting to guide the successful turnaround. The researcher posits
that the Head Start participants achieved turnaround success because the directors
developed critical competencies in the three areas: Preparing Self, Accessing Resources
and Leading Others.
The researcher has invoked meaning from the competencies developed by the
participants and suggests the participants employed a four-stage competency model. With
the absence of a competency model to describe Head Start turnaround, the researcher
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offers the introduction of a new model, the Four-Stage Turnaround model, to
operationalize the unique steps the participants engaged in (See figure 4.1). The findings
reveal that the participants developed skills related to self-preparation leveraging specific
knowledge to make improvements. Moreover, the directors employed the skills gained to
facilitate a process for leading staff and constituents which resulted in improving the
quality of the program and achieving a successful Federal Monitoring Review.
Furthermore, the researcher asserts that the participants achieved turnaround success
because all of the participants employed the Four-Stage Turnaround Model. It is the
assertion of the researcher that this model provides Head Start directors a roadmap for
success. The researcher proposes that Head Start directors employ the use of the model,
therefore, it is critical to examine this model further as it illustrates a road map for Head
Start directors to follow. The researcher posits that following the steps reviewed will
provide a strong strategy for achieving turnaround success.
The Four-Stage Turnaround model, as shown in Figure 4.1, details the action
steps taken by directors, the researcher contends that the actions steps can be altered
depending on the operating systems the participants are trying to effect. The actions steps
are specifically related to the systems that the participants intend to influence. The FourStage Turnaround model framework is broad enough to accommodate the expanding
strategic perspectives of Head Start turnaround directors and new research.
Informal learning circles. Head Start directors have developed a unique
community of support. Directors have adopted an informal learning community. The
study revealed that directors supported each other by filling in the gaps where
information is lacking. These finding imply that OHS is failing directors by not providing
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the critical information needed. Participants revealed that they sought the support of other
directors for information about non-compliance findings and best practices. It appears
that accessibility of information is a concern for directors.
This informal system of interpersonal learning developed by Head Start directors
provides critical learning. Participant data indicated that directors trust other Head Start
directors who operate programs in good standing. The study reveals that in some
instances directors provided support via phone calls, on-site visits and exchanged tips
about maintaining program compliance. The informal learning appears to be desirable
benefit for directors. The findings imply that Head Start program directors that do not
engage in local Head Start Association meetings and attend Head Start sessions miss
opportunities to engage and learn about new updates and best practices within Head Start
shared by other directors.
Head Start directors create learning circles through engagement with one another.
The learning circles developed by directors have contributed to the effectiveness of
program operations. The study findings imply that Head Start directors feel comfortable
engaging in nonthreatening social settings, where they can share experiences, skills and
best practices.
The current study suggests that relevant learning takes place in informal learning
circles and directors acquire skills and knowledge to support them in their roles.
Mezirow (2000) describes this as transformative learning. Throughout transformative
learning, individuals experience a shift of reference and explore new behaviors, shift their
attitudes, and build the confidence to lead in the new manner. The researcher proffers that
this mode of learning is critical to turnaround leaders. The study suggests that participants
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gained knowledge that supported their missions. The findings indicate that respondents
used the learning opportunities to develop actions steps to make improvements within
their programs. In agreement with Mezirow (2000), study findings support his assertion
that individuals shift behaviors. Directors that engaged in informal learning circles gained
valuable learning experiences. The researcher recommends the development of a system
to formalize learning between directors to create opportunities to expand learning among
programs and minimize opportunities for programs to repeat mistakes and mitigate the
risk of common non-compliances. Additionally, directors can establish regular mentoring
systems to ensure more Head Start directors operate high-quality programs by learning
from others. Head Start program directors could benefit from a formalized learning
system in an effort to significantly increase the number of programs achieving Federal
Monitoring Reviews with no findings operating in full compliance with the HSPS.
These recommendations, if heeded, are likely to positively impact the quality of
Head Start programs within the field ultimately improving services for the children and
families served. Furthermore, the next cohort of Head Start directors scheduled to receive
a Federal Monitoring Review can benefit and possibly mitigate the risk of being cited by
OHS with non-compliances and deficiencies.
Recommendations for Further Research
The study findings inform the field about how Head Start leaders improve their
programs and provide data on the specific action steps implemented by the respondents.
The findings reveal that the Four-Stage Turnaround model (See Figure 4.1) employs
three critical leadership competencies for Head Start directors conducting turnarounds:
Preparing Self, Accessing Resources and Leading Others. Future research should
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investigate if the three stages can operate independently and yield the successful
turnaround or affirm the current study’s findings that the four-stage process work
concomitantly and all steps must be employed to achieve turnaround success.
Additionally, the findings reveal that the actions steps that the turnaround leaders
engaged in while employing the four-stage model align with seven of Kotter’s (1996)
eight-stage change model. This study presents pioneering research regarding Head Start
turnaround. It is critical to develop further research to add to the body of knowledge and
build a representative body of work in the field to expand the discourse regarding Head
Start turnaround.
The Report to Congress (2009) reveals that there is an increase in the number of
Head Start programs with noncompliant findings. Further studies are needed to examine
if the turnaround practices described by the respondents will yield the same results or
additional results if a larger pool is examined. Moreover, the study could be expanded by
investigating if the study participants sustained the improvements and achieved
subsequent successful Federal Monitoring Reviews with no findings.
OHS and independent consultants have a critical role in the Managing Self step.
Findings reveal that that the directors must have an established relationship of trust with
the consultants in order to successfully gain knowledge and effectively achieve technical
support. Future research might explore the relationship between consultants and Head
Start turnaround leaders during the Managing Self stage to examine the practices that
lead to trust and define relational behaviors that lead to increased turnaround success.
Further research is recommended to provide an investigation of Head Start
directors leading high-performing programs to Head Start directors facilitating a
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turnaround in low-performing programs contrast the competencies and actions steps
among the two groups. Additional research is recommended to investigate the turnaround
practices in non-Head Start settings. However, the current study contributes to a better
understanding of competencies and actions steps of Head Start directors’ transforming
their low-performing Head Start program to high performing. In so doing, it suggests a
new direction for turnaround research and theoretical development.
Conclusion
Many Head Start programs are faced with the problem of chronic non-compliance
and deficient statuses. Recent Reports to Congress (2009) indicate that chronic poor
performance is an increasing epidemic for Head Start Grantees. However, there is an
absence of literature that investigates the action steps of Head Start leaders during the
turnaround process. This study addressed the urgent need to investigate the approaches
used in non-compliant and deficient programs to successfully meet the HSPS and achieve
a Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. Accordingly, as discussed in Chapter 2,
the purpose of this study is to investigate the turnaround practices as identified by Head
Start directors that improved their low-performing programs and transformed the
programs to full compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards to achieve a
successful Federal Monitoring Review.
The study relied on data collected from six Head Start directors. The qualitative
methodology enabled the researcher to analyze the relationship between the strategies the
leaders engaged in and the changes within their programs. The researcher analyzed the
strategies of the Head Start directors interviewed to the practices found in the literature.
Four themes emerged from the study data: (a) Organizational Noncompliance, (b)
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Managing Self, (c) Managing Others, and (d) Systems Turnaround. The first theme
Organizational Noncompliance included four areas: (a) Finance, (b) Shared Governance,
(c) Human Resources, and (d) Ongoing Monitoring Systems. Five of the six directors
agreed that fiscal procedures and financial matters were not their areas of expertise and
consequently were disconnected from HSPS and fiscal operations.
Turnaround leaders stressed the importance of improving shared governance.
Four of the six respondents detailed the importance of ensuring that governance
procedures paralleled the HSPS. Program directors identified improvements needed in
the area of parent participation and ensuring the board was provided clarity on their roles
and responsibilities.
In the area of Human Resources, poor performance were attributed to the lack of
staff qualifications and failure to update policies and procedures to reflect the HSPS. Five
of the six Head Start leaders identified the lack of ongoing monitoring systems as another
attributing factor to their programs non-compliant or deficient status. Collectively the six
programs were cited for 63 non-compliances and seven deficiencies. All of the directors
implemented a successful strategy to improve their program to achieve a successful
Federal Monitoring Review with no findings.
Managing self, the second theme introduces the idea that directors began their
turnaround trajectory in a process of building inner strength and created personal change
through self-preparation and self-reflection. Additionally, the directors engaged in formal
and informal technical assistance. Formal technical assistance is provided through OHS
consultants or Independent consultants hired directly by the grantee. Informal technical
assistance materializes in one or a combination of the following five areas (a) previous
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experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head Start trainings, (d)
attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools.
Managing others, the third theme, provides findings that reveal that Head Start
directors utilize the skills gained in managing self to guide subordinates and constituents
through the successful turnaround. Directors facilitate their staff through the change
process by reculturing, improving communication, providing professional development,
and executing strong monitoring plans.
Systems turnaround, the last theme, findings imply that the participants applied
the skills gained and through the application of a four-stage framework. The four-stage
model, referred to as the Four-Stage Turnaround Model (See Figure 4.1). As described,
the model includes four stages: Preparing Self, Accessing Resources, Leading Others and
Turnaround Systems.
In the first stage, Preparing Self, the participants developed self-efficacy skills
and generative capabilities to guide the turnaround strategy. The second stage Accessing
Resources, the participants assessed the types of technical assistance resources necessary
to guide the turnaround strategy, next Leading Others, the third stage, the participants led
staff in a reculturing process, improved communication, executed ongoing monitoring
systems and provided professional development for staff, parents and board members. All
stages influence the final stage, Turnaround Systems. In this stage, the participants’
focused on systems turnaround efforts in human resources, finance, shared governance,
and ongoing monitoring. The directors’ stories provide evidence that the combination of
their competencies in Preparing Self, Accessing Resources and Leading Others in tandem
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with their specific execution steps situated them to accomplish a successful Federal
Monitoring Reviews with no finding and in full compliance with the HSPS.
Based on the findings in this study, the researcher can imply that institutionalizing
the change requires more than ongoing monitoring systems. It requires consistent
communication between the Head Start turnaround leader and the staff. Themes in the
study indicate that the change leader must engage in a process of in preparing self and
accessing technical assistance resources. It is essential for the Head Start directors to
engage in training and research to understand new developments on the horizon. Head
Start directors must ensure that they are connected to changes within the HSPS and its
implications. The participants achieved training through informal and formal technical
assistance. Additionally, the participants provide evidence of employing their turnaround
competencies and the importance of the intersection of the Preparing Self, Accessing
Resources, and Leading Others stages and its implications in the Turnaround Systems
stage.
Six recommendations are presented in the study. The researcher proposes three
recommendations for OHS: (a) anonymously survey Head Start directors to understand
their perspectives for causes for chronic noncompliance, (b) establish a sense of trust
between OHS consultants and Head Start Grantees, (c) develop measures to validate and
formalize informal learning communities among Head Start directors. Additionally, the
researcher posits three recommendations for Head Start directors: (a) employ the use of
the Four-Stage Turnaround model as a road map for turnaround success, (b) development
of a system to formalize informal learning communities between directors, (c) establish
mentoring systems between directors.
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The Head Start turnaround leaders demonstrate that turnaround leaders reflect
competencies in understanding Organizational Noncompliance, Managing Self, and
Managing Others. Managing Self and Managing Others must interact concomitantly in
order to achieve the successful turnaround. Head Start directors achieved successful
turnaround because they engaged in three critical phases during their turnaround effort.
Directors understood the reasons for their programs non-compliances, managed
themselves through a process of preparing self and established inner strength in addition
to engaging in technical assistance and leading others. This process facilitated a path for
Head Start directors to guide staff in changing behaviors to ensure compliance with the
HSPS.
These findings present an important addition to turnaround research. It introduces
a new model to analyze Head Start turnaround and provides the entry of Head Start
discourse to the turnaround field. This entry establishes the importance to the work of
Head Start turnaround directors as change leaders. Implications of these findings are
encouraging for Head Start directors, Head Start directors have a competency model to
follow and employ. The specific action steps that the participants engaged in provide a
roadmap to improve program operations within Head Start programs for the benefit of the
children and families served.
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Appendix A
Dear Head Start Director,
My name is Sean Tracy and I am a doctoral candidate at St. John Fisher College in
Rochester, NY. I am writing you to seek your assistance with my dissertation research, in
an effort to add to the body of knowledge on turnaround theory and its application in
Head Start programs. I am interested in learning about how Head Start directors describe
their experiences leading their program to achieving full compliance with the Federal
Performance Standards for Federal Review accountability. Your program has been
distinguished as achieving a full compliance finding at your most recent Federal
Monitoring Review. This finding provides evidence that your program has implemented
substantial improvements from your previous Federal Review. I would like to learn more
about how you led your team through such substantial program improvements. Your
leadership and recent Federal Review findings demonstrate that you have an important
story to share. Your story and participation is voluntary. I will make every attempt to
ensure that your stories and program identity remain anonymous. I will use pseudonyms
to protect your program identity. At no time will your name, geographic location or
identifying program data be identified through the study, completion of the project, or at
time of publication.
This study has been reviewed and approved by the St. John Fisher College Institutional
Review Board (IRB). I would be honored if you would support in my research project by
participating in one telephone interview and complete a brief demographic survey. The
interview will last approximately one hour; the survey will take less than ten minutes to
complete. I will also request to review your most recent Federal Review documents and
Program Information Report. With your consent, the interview will be audio taped and
transcribed. The transcription will be forwarded to you for your review and approval.
I appreciate your consideration in participating in this research study. You will be helping
to contribute to the field by introducing a theory that has not been applied to early
childcare and education. Your survey responses will remain confidential.
Thank you in advance for contributing to such important research.

Sincerely,
Sean Tracy
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Appendix B
Part 1: Demographic Questions
Q1 Thank you for agreeing to participate in this ground breaking research
regarding successful turnaround practices in Head Start Programs. This survey will take
about ten minutes to complete. Once you have completed the survey, I will contact you to
schedule your telephone interview. My contact information is as follows: Sean Tracy585
305-0977

Q2 Please list your current title

Q3 Your program has been identified as making improvements between your most
recent Federal Review and the Federal Review prior to your most recent review. Did you
lead the improvement process?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Q4 When did you begin the improvement process? Please list month and year.

Answer If Did you lead the improvement process? No Is Selected
Q5 Who led the improvement process? Are they still employed with your program?

Q6 How long have you served in your current position?
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 less than 6 months (1)
 6 months -1 year (2)
 1 year (3)
 2 years (4)
 3-5 years (5)
 6-8 years (6)
 8-10 years (7)
 10-15 years (8)
 15-20 years (9)
 More than 20 years (10)

Q7 Gender
 Male (1)
 Female (2)

Q8 In what age group are you?
 19 and under (1)
 20-29 (2)
 30-39 (3)
 40-49 (4)
 50-59 (5)
 60-69 (6)
 70+ (7)
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Q9 Please describe your ethnicity
 American Indian (1)
 Asian (2)
 Biracial (3)
 Black/African-American (4)
 Latino/Hispanic (5)
 White (6)
 Other (7)

Q10 Describe any professional development that you believe helped you with the
improvement process. Please list any in-service, workshops, college courses, or books.
You may answer none.

Q11 Did you receive any additional support with your improvement process. Please list
supports.
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Answer If Did you receive any additional support with your improvem... Yes Is Selected
Q12 Please list the supports your received.
 Office of Head Start (1)
 STGI Technical Support (2)
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 Other Head Start Directors (3)
 Consultants (4)
 Other (5)

Answer If Did you receive any additional support with your improvement process... Yes
Is Selected
Q13 What did the supports provide you with? Please describe.

Q14 Please list the capacities in which you have served throughout your Head Start
Career. Please list the positions you have held at any Head Start Program.
 Maintenance (1)
 Receptionist (2)
 Consultant (3)
 Cook (4)
 Education Coordinator (5)
 Assistant Teacher (6)
 Teacher (7)
 Assistant Director (8)
 Director (9)
 Finance Manager (10)
 Executive Director (11)
 Volunteer (12)
 Other, Please specify (13)
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Q15 What financial resources were available to implement the required changes?

Q16 Briefly describe your Head Start Program reporting structure
Q17 What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 CDA (1)
 High School / GED (2)
 Some College (3)
 2-year College Degree (4)
 4-year College Degree (5)
 Masters Degree (6)
 Doctoral Degree (7)
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) (8)

Q18 Please select a response that best describes your program today.
 Head Start only (1)
 Head Start and Universal Prekindergarten (PreK) (2)
 Head Start and wrap-care ( care for children beyond Head Start Program hours) (3)
 Head Start and Daycare (4)
 Head Start, daycare, wrap-care, Pre-K, and school-age programs (5)

Q19 List the key staff that you believe were critical to the change process. Please list
titles not names.
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Q20 Please provide the best number to contact you for the interview. The questions will
be provided prior to the interview.
Q21 Thank you for taking the time to participate in this important research.
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Appendix C
Part 2: Standardized Open-ended Phone Interview Questions
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the survey today. Your input will be used
to inform research regarding program improvements. I recognize that you have a busy
schedule and I will be respectful of your time. Today’s interview will take about 45
minutes. We’ll talk about your program and its current status as a high quality
program and what you did to make it the success it is today. I will refer to your
Federal Review from 20__ as Federal Review 1 and your last Federal Monitoring
Review as Federal Review 2. Do you have any questions before we begin?
Now we will talk about your program: its structure; the strategy you implemented;
your end results; communication with your stakeholders; management of your
program; financial management; human resource issues; professional development;
and wrap up the interview with any recommendations you may have for other
programs. Are you ready to begin?
Program Description
1.

Describe your program today compared to Review One?
a. Were you employed with the program at Review One? If no, go to section
i.
i. If not, who was leading the program?
ii. What was your role?
iii. When did you begin leading the program?
iv. Did you make changes in the structure between Review One and
Review Two?
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Professional Development
2.

3.

What professional development did you receive that you implement the
improvements? Workshops, books, college courses etc.
a. Staff?
i. Who provided the training?
ii. List the topics.
iii. List the topics.
Describe any support you received from?
a. Office of Head Start?
b. STGI Technical Support?
c. From other Head Start programs?
d. Consultants?
i. What did the consultants provide?
ii. What did they offer?

Next we will talk about your improvement strategy and how it was developed.
Strategy
4.

5.

How did you plan for the improvement process after receiving results from
review 1?
a. When did you begin the improvement process?
b. Was the plan formal or informal?
c. Did the actions you put in place address the non-compliances?
d. Tell me about the actions you took?
e. How did you figure out the sequence of actions to take?
f. What was the outcome?
i. Tell me more about what you learned at this stage?
I want to learn more about what factors you believe contributed to your
overall success?
a. Did you collaborate with other programs?
b. Did other programs or individuals help you? If so, who?

Fiscal
6.
7.

Were there any financial resources available to implement the required
changes? If yes, how much and from whom?
Did you make any cutbacks to your program from Review One to Review
Two? If so, what?
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8.
9.
10.

Did you receive a grant to make improvements?
Did you lose any funding from Review One to Review Two?
What were there any unexpected costs necessary to improve your program? If
so, what?

End Results
11.

Think about Review One and Review Two, How did you know you were
making progression towards the goals prior to Review two?
a. How did you know you were ready for Review Two?
b.What were your indicators of program improvement?

Now we are going to talk about your stakeholders and their involvement in the
improvement process
Stakeholders
12.

Tell me about how staff were involved in the improvement process?
a. Parents?
b. Other stakeholders?
c. Consultants?

Now we are going to talk about Communication
Communication
13.

Tell me about any changes in communication pattern from Review 1 in
comparison to now?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Parents?
Staff?
Board of Directors?
Policy Council/Committee?
With other stakeholders?

Now were are going to talk about your management of the program
Management
14.
15.
16.

Did your monitoring procedures change after Review 1. If so, how?
a. Describe monitoring procedures now?
Describe how you used the Program Information Report (PIR) to inform your
improvement plan?
How did the culture change between Review 1 and Review 2?
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17.

How did you change your organizational structure from Review One to
Review Two?

Now we are at the final section. We are going to discuss your staff.
Staff
18.

19.

Tell me about staff turnover from Review One to now:
a. What is turnover like today?
b. Did you expand or reduce staff between reviews?
How are you and staff held accountable for performance?

We’re almost done, now we are going to talk about professional development. I would
like to learn about the trainings that you and your staff were involved in.
We are at the end of our interview. I’d like to get your final thoughts about any other
items you believe should be discussed.
Final thoughts
20.
21.

Are there any things that you would do differently?
Do you have any recommendations for others?

Closing Statements
22.
23.

Is there anything that I have missed that you would like to share?
Do you have any questions for me?

If I have any follow up questions may I call you back? Would you like a copy of my
dissertation when the research is completed? Thank you again for your patience and
participation.
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